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ABSTRACT 
The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (MB) is one of the biggest Islamist movements in the 
Middle East and North Africa, and its role in the future of Egyptian politics deserves 
careful consideration in light of the recent overthrow of Hosni Mubarak’s regime. Over 
the past decades, the MB has changed their relationship with successive Egyptian 
authoritarian regimes by continuously renouncing violence and abiding by a moderate 
path as a means to achieve their objectives. This study uses competing theoretical 
approaches to understand the reasons behind the Muslim Brotherhood’s decision to abide 
by a moderate strategy. The major finding of this study is that, over time, a combination 
of external and internal factors, such as regime repression and constraints and leadership, 
organizational and generational structures, as well as ideological influences, have shaped 
the organization’s decision making. Furthermore, this study highlights the stagnation of 
this moderate development in the face of both regime constraints and internal leadership 
and generational issues, and demonstrates that the mode of recovery from this stagnation 
will be critical in the Muslim Brotherhood’s future orientation as a movement. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Since its foundation by the young schoolteacher Hasan al-Banna in 1928, the 
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood has become a powerful mass movement characterized by 
broad public support that enables it to present strong political opposition to different 
Egyptian regimes. Despite phases of cooperation between the Muslim Brotherhood and 
the ruling regimes headed by various presidents, for the most part, the relationship has 
been shaped by the state’s comprehensive repression of the organization. The followers 
of the Muslim Brotherhood attributed the cultural, economic, and social grievances, as 
well as the stagnating democratization of the country, to bad governance by Egyptian 
political leaders, which widened the gap between both sides. However, a revolution or 
any other form of violent regime change was never considered an option for the Muslim 
Brotherhood in bringing about political change in Egypt. On the contrary, the Muslim 
Brotherhood has continued to pursue a nonviolent path, rejected violent and radical 
tendencies within the organization, and openly opposed radical Islamist movements that 
were using force and terror against the Egyptian state.1 The aim of this thesis is to answer 
the major research question: Why did the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood pursue its 
moderate path and reject a radical strategy against the different ruling regimes?  
The relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian state covers a 
relatively long period of time, marked by the presidencies of Gamal Adel Nasser, Anwar 
Sadat, and Hosni Mubarak. This factor adds to the enormous and intricate complexity of 
the research question. Taking this factor into account, it will be further necessary to ask 
the following questions:  
                                                 
1 In this context, radicalization and moderation are understood as processes of relative change. 
Radicalization presents the ideological and/or behavioral transformations of a movement leading to the 
rejection of democratic principles and the very likely use of violence as a means to achieve political 
objectives. Moderation describes the ideological and/or behavioral change of Islamist movements towards 
the acceptance of democracy (for example acceptance of democratic values or the participation in 
elections). Omar Ashour, The De-Radicalization of Jihadists: Transforming armed Islamist movements 
(New York: Routledge, 2009), 4–7. 
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1. What factors influenced the strategies and objectives of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in its organizational development?  
2. Did these factors change over time? 
3. What was the causal weight of different factors on the behavior of the 
Muslim Brotherhood?  
B. IMPORTANCE 
In recent years, many publications in newspapers, journals, or books have 
questioned the stability of Egypt, anticipating a press for political change or even 
considering the country at the brink of revolution, for various reasons.2 These 
assumptions were eventually confirmed in 2011. After revolutionary public pressure 
based on mounting dissatisfaction with the authoritarian regime’s rule, Egyptian 
president Hosni Mubarak was forced to resign. Mubarak, who was considered an ally in 
the pursuit of Western regional policies, left the Armed Forces Supreme Council in 
charge of the country. Since then, the Egyptians face an uncertain future, which gives 
reason for concern with regard to relations between Egypt and the West. In particular, 
news of increasing Islamist influence is perceived as a huge threat to Western interests by 
prominent Western politicians, militaries, and Middle Eastern scholars. They fear that 
Islamist currents raise anti-Western, conservative, or even radical Islamic sentiments, 
which oppose further democratic development and Western political influence in Egypt 
and the Middle East. In this context, the objectives of the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt’s 
largest Islamist organization, are judged.  
Having lost regional influence due to the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement of 
Sadat’s presidency and emerging powers like Iran and Turkey, Egypt still plays an 
important role with regard to the stability of the Middle East. This is of particular interest 
for American and Western policymakers. The role of the Muslim Brotherhood, which 
already formed strong opposition against the old regime and enjoys popularity in 
                                                 
2 Aladdin Elaasar, “Is Egypt Stable?” Middle East Quarterly 16, no.3 (Summer 2009): 69–75. “After 
Mubarak,” The Economist 396, iss. 8691 (July 17, 2010): SS15–SS16. Helmar Dumbs, “Ägypten-Experte: 
‘Kritische Masse will den Wandel’,” DiePresse.com, February 22, 2010, accessed November 12, 2010, 
http://diepresse.com/home/politik/aussenpolitik/541610/aegyptenexpertekritische-masse-will-den-
wandel?from=suche.intern.portal. Rabab El-Mahdi and Philip Marfleet, Egypt: The Moment of Change 
(New York: Zed Books Ltd., 2009). John R. Bradley, Inside Egypt: The Land of the Pharaohs on the Brink 
of a Revolution (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008/2009). 
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Egyptian society, should not be underestimated and might crucially tip the scales in a 
potential turmoil or in unstable times characterized by uncertainty. Especially under these 
circumstances, the certainty that the Muslim Brotherhood did not tend to turn radical, but 
despite their repression for decades, eventually pursue a peaceful political transition may 
lay Western fears to rest. 
Furthermore, the Egyptian Society of the Muslim Brothers is the oldest and most 
important organization of political Islamism. Its rise as an Islamic reform movement had 
influence not only on political developments in Egypt, but also in other countries. The 
dissemination of its ideas, resources, or even personnel led to the foundation of many 
branches or subsidiaries in the Arab, and later the Western, world. Although these 
subsidiaries have mostly aligned their political emphasis with the influences of their 
national and political environments, there is still an active exchange of ideas and mutual 
support among the organizations.  
Though Egypt has steadily lost cultural and political influence as a leading Arab 
state since the end of the Nasser era, national developments might still have a tremendous 
influence on the Arab world. For that reason, a behavior or policy change by a leading 
former opposition force with a vital network to its subsidiaries, such as the Muslim 
Brotherhood, might cause significant changes in politics of other states. Moreover, the 
role of a leading Islamist organization may be critical in these times, when many consider 
the recent public uprisings as a revolutionary domino effect that will spread further and 
further. Even Western societies whose demographics predict a rising Muslim population 
are perhaps affected.3  
Once more, this link between Islamist organizations underlines another reason 
that the West has an interest in preserving stability in Egypt after the revolution. Beyond 
that, this also explains why a further analysis of the moderate development of the 
                                                 
3 Paul M. Lützeler, “Germany Today, or the Atlantic Dream,” in Kulturpolitik und Politik der 
Kultur/Cultural Politics and the Politics of Culture, ed. Helen Fehervary and Bernd Fischer (Bern: Peter 
Lang AG, 2007), 83–84. Adrian Michaels, “Muslim Europe: the demographic time bomb transforming the 




Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and its rejection of radicalism is so important. Based on 
the existing network, the denial of violence of the Egyptian moderate Islamists, despite 
repression by an authoritarian regime, may be an example for its branches in other 
countries with similar experiences or political conditions. The Egyptian organization 
might influence others to make positive changes in policies and induce a spirit of 
moderation.  
Finally, most of the present literature explains how radical Islamist movements 
can be de-radicalized and deliver different solutions or tools based on experiences from 
involvement in national programs. Other authors focus on the different reasons for social 
and violent revolutions within states, and even Muslim rebellions against their states. But, 
having a compelling example like the Muslim Brotherhood at hand, it is necessary to 
analyze why an Islamist movement, through the different episodes in its past, repeatedly 
denies radicalization and abides by a moderate development to achieve its objective. This 
will provide valuable information to governments in dealing with similar organizations 
within their own countries in the future. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In the course of this thesis, five theoretical approaches are considered to 
contribute to an explanation of the pursuit of moderation by the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood and will be applied to the case of the Islamist organization. The following 
literature review will briefly discuss these theories chosen to deliver a promising 
explanation for the moderate and nonviolent path of the Muslim Brothers. 
The first theoretical approach is to answer the research question from a political 
perspective, based on the findings of Robert Michels, a German sociologist who studied 
the development of socialist and social-democratic parties in Europe. Michels’s 
observations led to his political theory of the “iron law of oligarchy,” which was 
published in his book Political Parties.4 According to this theory, the bigger a party 
                                                 
4 Robert Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern 
Democracy, trans. Eden and Cedar Paul (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1959). While most of the 
book focuses on leadership, only part six deals in detail with the iron law of oligarchy and organizational 
elements of parties. 
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grows over time, the more necessary will be bureaucratic elements to lead and structure 
it. Bureaucracy provides a hierarchical structure that ensures efficiency and enables 
communication between members and decision-making within the party. In short, 
successful interaction and participation of these parties under their environmental 
influences makes the adoption of an institutional structure mandatory. 
Once in place, bureaucracy develops from a means to an end. With regard to the 
parties analyzed by Michels, bureaucracy leads to a preoccupation with running the 
organization and further securing its success. Formerly revolutionary ideas are step by 
step undermined and give way to bureaucratic necessities. Additionally, it is an objective 
of the party’s leaders to consolidate their interests as an elite within the party. Therefore, 
Michels concludes, the organization of a party ultimately leads to oligarchy or oligarchic 
tendencies.5  
Oligarchy prevents a political party from taking risks that challenge its existence 
and bureaucracy preoccupies it and prevents it from following revolutionary tendencies. 
Thus Michels’s theory presents a possible explanation for the moderate development of 
the Muslim Brotherhood. In contrast with the following two theoretical approaches, 
Michels’s findings are applicable to all organizations in general and do not necessarily 
imply political participation. However, if a group or movement seeks to enter political 
life, institutional and bureaucratic complexity increases according to the core 
requirements of its political activity.  
The second and third theories that may explain the behavior of the Brotherhood 
focus on the relationship between political party and voter. First, there is the “median 
voter theory” first mentioned in an article by the Scottish economist Duncan Black and 
later popularized in a 1957 book by the economist Anthony Downs.6 Downs assumes in 
An Economic Theory of Democracy that an organization entering the political game 
primarily seeks power, income, and prestige—in short, success. In this context, he 
                                                 
5 Michels, Political Parties, 372–374, 400–401. 
6 Duncan Black, “On the Rationale of Group Decision-making,” The Journal of Political Economy 56, 
no.1 (February 1948): 23–34. Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper 
and Row Publishers, Inc., 1957), chs. 4, 7–8. 
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considers ideology and political ideas important to an organization; they are usually the 
expression of its purpose. However, Downs contends that in order to survive in the 
political arena per se and be successful, organizations must, if necessary, prioritize their 
pursuit of political survival and influence over their “…desire to implement ideological 
doctrines or serve particular social groups.”7 
Consequently, it is of highest importance for parties to attract a majority of voters, 
even if this means an ideological shift, and according to the median voter theory, an 
organization’s ultimate key to success in elections is winning the middle of the voting 
spectrum. Therefore, a party does well to change its political programs and commit to the 
mainstream voters to ensure electoral success. 
Applied to powerful Islamist parties or organizations, this means that these groups 
when entering political life probably move away from any extreme, revolutionary, or 
radical positions in order to maintain enough support to secure their position in the 
political game. In doing so, they are fully aware of the fact that they will lose their voters 
again if they return to their extremist political origin. In the long run, this leads to a more 
centrist course or political position with increasingly moderate views and further political 
openness.  
However, the median voter theory only applies to single-peaked voting 
preferences, that is, if a single culmination of voters in the middle of the voting spectrum 
exists. In two- or multiple-peaked voting preferences, with more than one culmination, 
the political advantages of the median voters are inapplicable. 
Electoral incentives are also an important element of another explanation for 
political behavior, the “pothole theory.” In her article “Taming Extremist Parties: Lessons 
from Europe,” Sheri Berman offers the pothole theory as an explanation for the pursuit of 
moderation.8 This approach assumes that an organization’s political environment and its 
participation in democratic institutions strongly influence its behavior. This leads to 
                                                 
7 Downs, An Economic Theory, 112. 
8 Sheri Berman, “Taming Extremist Parties: Lessons from Europe,” Journal of Democracy 19, no.1 
(January 2008): 5–6. 
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Berman’s argument that an organization or a party that is entering the political game—no 
matter if it has revolutionary or extremist roots—must constantly convince its voters that 
it is capable of meeting constituent expectations. 
There is a simple reason for this argument. In a party-voter relationship, 
dissatisfied voters are able to impose electoral sanctions on a party if it does not meet the 
wishes and demands of the constituency. Therefore, parties try to avoid these so-called 
audience costs and please their voters and potential constituents whenever possible. 
While the satisfaction of the voters becomes more and more a determinant factor in daily 
party life, the importance of a political party’s objectives and behavior turn out to lose 
influence. Therefore, Berman concludes that organizations following this principle 
“…are busy filling potholes, fixing cracked sidewalks, and upgrading faulty sewage 
systems [and] tend to have little time left over for ideology, political rigidity, or 
radicalism.”9 
However, median-voter and pothole theory only apply to situations when political 
activity is possible for a party or organization. Especially in an authoritarian environment, 
the opportunities to participate in elections or public electoral processes are often 
restricted. This restriction ensures the unchallenged rule of the respective regime by 
excluding potential political opponents from the political game.  
Referring to Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, the idea of “Islamist auto-reform” also 
needs to be considered as an explanation regarding the behavior of Islamist 
organizations.10 Wickham defines Islamist auto-reform “…as the call for change in a 
movement’s goals and strategies by members of the movement itself.”11 She argues that 
over time, political groups pass through a kind of learning process while playing the 
political game. These groups internalize the rules and norms of their political 
environment or framework, which eventually has a great impact on their ideology and 
behavior. In other words, participation in politics not only influences an organization’s 
                                                 
9 Berman, “Taming Extremist Parties,” 6. 
10 Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, “The Causes and Dynamics of Islamist Auto-Reform,” ICIS 
International 6, no.2 (Winter 2006): 6–7. 
11 Ibid., 6. 
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tactical moves in the political arena, but also a change of ideological or strategic 
principles of the whole organization by the means of internalization.  
Consequently, argues Wickham, the Islamist movements manage to move away 
from their strict Islamist views, which are often not compatible with modern and 
democratic political concepts. In turn, this gives room for further openness to new 
political ideas and nonviolent development within these political groups. Therefore, 
Wickham’s Islamist auto-reform presents another interesting theoretical approach that 
needs to be taken into account regarding the case of the Muslim Brotherhood. However, a 
downside of this theory is that Islamist auto-reform depends on a kind of cost-benefit 
ratio for the group, eventually influencing its will to be open to changes. This means for 
instance, that an organization’s leadership has to be convinced that reform is beneficial to 
the group. Therefore, the mere fact of participation in a liberal political arena does not 
necessarily lead to moderation but does, at least, offer the opportunity.12   
A last theoretical approach is founded on the assumption in “organizational 
theory” that organizations are significantly influenced by external or extrinsic factors and 
internal or intrinsic factors. In this context, external factors are understood as variables 
shaping the environment of an organization, such as political, legal, economic, cultural, 
or social factors. It is rather difficult for an organization to influence these heteronomous 
variables. Internal factors, such as leadership, motivation, learning receptivity, values 
(cultural or ideological), generational shifts, conflicts, or the formal structure also 
represent important characteristics that need to be analyzed in the course of this thesis.13 
Some of the factors mentioned in the context of organizational theory will already 
be covered by the other theoretical approaches discussed above and, thus, will not reveal 
new or further explanations to the given case. However, the analysis of the behavior of 
                                                 
12 Wickham, “Islamist Auto-Reform,” 7. Besides leadership, influential cooperation with other groups 
or parties, a powerful political base or a general majoritarian openness and attraction might also be 
important.  
13 Jerald Greenberg and Robert A. Baron, Behavior in Organizations: Understanding and Managing 
the Human Side of Work (Upper Saddle River: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 2000). Andrew J. Dubrin, Foundations 
of Organizational Behavior: An Applied Perspective (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1984). Steven 
L. McShane and Mary Ann Von Glinow, Organizational Behavior: Essentials (New York: McGraw-
Hill/Irwin, 2007). Babette E. Bensoussan and Craig S. Fleisher, Analysis without Paralysis: 10 tools to 
make better strategic decisions (Upper Saddle River: Pearson Education, Inc., 2008), Ch. 10–11. 
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the Muslim Brotherhood demands further focus on external factors like political, legal, 
and social influences, as well as on the impact of leadership, generational shifts, and 
conflicts on the internal side of the organizational spectrum.  
For example, the consequences of state repression in its different forms may be an 
important aspect of external political and legal factors in any given case. Furthermore, an 
organization is probably influenced by its social environment, forces opposing it, and 
other parties, all of which eventually affect its behavior. All these examples represent 
important external factors for a political organization and need to be analyzed. External 
factors present themselves as opportunities or possible threats to an organization, both of 
which considerably channel its actions, policies and energies.  
Analyzing internal factors, on the other hand, reveals strengths and weaknesses of 
an organization that affect its intrinsic motivation to adapt or deny a certain policy or 
path. Thus, by considering internal and external factors in the framework of 
organizational theory, further rationale for organizational behavior of the Muslim 
Brotherhood may be provided. At the same time, this theoretical approach will top off the 
four other theoretical foundations of the thesis. Nevertheless, due to the obviously 
comprehensive character of this approach, additional restrictions are inevitable and will 
be determined within the thesis.  
The literature review focuses on these theories as the key to solving the research 
question. At this point, a detailed presentation of the manifold and extensive literature on 
the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood would go far beyond the scope of this literature 
review. Therefore, in the course of this thesis the above-mentioned literature will be used 
to access scholarly views on the Muslim Brotherhood. 
D. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
The theoretical approaches chosen to find an answer to the research question 
produce the following hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1: The bigger and more organized an Islamist group grows, the more 
it is focused on managing the organization and the more averse it is to taking any risk that 
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threatens loss of its achievement. Consequently, it rejects extremist policies and becomes 
more moderate. If a group is smaller and less organizational effort is necessary to control 
and lead it, the rejection of further moderation is likely. Furthermore, if a group grows 
and organizational elements are not installed, control is nonexistent and even 
radicalization is possible.  
Hypothesis 2: If an Islamist movement is able to secure its political position by 
concentrating its political efforts on the median voter within the political arena, it will 
have political success and adopt centrist political views. However, if the movement 
focuses on its original core constituency, as distinct from the peak of voters, it will have 
less success and abide by its extremist attitude, which opposes moderation. 
Hypothesis 3: When Islamist movements like the Muslim Brotherhood participate 
in an electoral process in accordance with the pothole theory and, therefore, focus on the 
wishes and demands of constituents, they turn towards or abide by a moderate political 
development. Otherwise, they will consistently strive for the achievement of their 
Islamist objectives, if necessary, by adopting radical or rigid traits. 
Hypothesis 4: The longer an organization participates in the political game and 
follows the rules of the game, the higher the possibility that moderate traits succeed over 
ideological views. If a more radical or extremist organization attends the political arena 
for only a short period, its extreme ideological views dominate its political appearance. 
Hypothesis 5: Based on organizational theory, development and decision making 
in any organization are significantly influenced by the external and internal factors to 
which it is exposed. Therefore, extrinsic or intrinsic impacts provoke behavior. In phases 
without these impacts, no development occurs at all. However, if they are present, 
internal and external factors can enforce moderate development of an Islamist group in 
addition to the other possibilities already mentioned above. If either external or internal 
factors deny this, moderation stalls and radical, or extreme, tendencies quite likely 
increase. 
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E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
The research question seeks to determine why the Muslim Brotherhood continued 
to pursue a moderate path and rejected a radical strategy against different Egyptian 
regimes. The factors that influenced the decision making process are of vital interest for 
the solution of the puzzle. However, the question cannot be considered outside of context, 
namely, the influence of the respective ruling authoritarian regimes in Egypt on decision 
making. Without considering the circumstances, a true and comprehensive answer to the 
research question is not possible. Therefore, in order to answer the given research 
question, the single case-study method is considered best and will be used. Certain 
intervening variables will be analyzed thereby to link potential cause to observed effects 
or actions in certain periods of history and, thus, explain the decision making of the 
Muslim Brotherhood. 
In the given case study, it will be easier to split the interaction between the 
Islamist organization and the Egyptian state into different periods, according to the 
presidents of the respective ruling regimes. The reason for this approach is simple. After 
the Free Officers Movement of 1952, the political system in Egypt became a centralized 
regime headed by a president pooling all power in his person. Therefore, the external 
factors, which have affected the Muslim Brotherhood, are strongly dependent on the 
influence of the authoritarian rulers of Egypt—this means Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar 
Sadat, and Hosni Mubarak. 
The theoretical approach to the question is founded on the different theories 
discussed in the literature review of this introduction. The thesis will mainly rely on 
secondary literature or publicly accessible information, such as Internet sources, different 
sources of Egyptian public opinion, and statements of the Egyptian government and 
Muslim Brotherhood (MB).      
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis is organized into three main chapters and a concluding chapter.  
Chapter II explores the relationship between the MB and the Gamal Abdel Nasser 
regime. The analysis will focus on the circumstances that led to a split in the Islamist 
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organization and eventually the breakaway of a radical grouping while the movement’s 
mainstream finalized a decision to deny violence. 
Chapter III examines the interaction between Nasser’s successor, Anwar Sadat, 
and the Muslim Brotherhood during the 1970s. The chapter provides insight into the 
further consolidation of the MB’s moderate path, despite a revival of more radical trends 
in Egyptian society. 
Chapter IV considers the development of the Muslim Brotherhood during the 
Mubarak era. This chapter illustrates how different influences facilitated a kind of jumpy 
rollercoaster ride, which led to a constant back and forth between a moderate and rather 
conservative alignment of the MB. Furthermore, it provides an explanation why the 
moderate progression of the MB eventually stagnated by the end of the last decade.    
Finally, Chapter V summarizes the findings of this thesis and it presents the 
rationale behind the decision to pursue moderation and reject radicalization. Furthermore, 
it briefly considers how the findings may draw a deduction for the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
potential behavior and political path after Hosni Mubarak’s resignation in 2011.  
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II. SPLIT IN RADICALS AND MODERATES IN THE NASSER 
ERA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In the 1920s, there emerged in Egypt a young Islamist movement, the Muslim 
Brotherhood. Based on the aim of its founder, Hasan al-Banna, to establish an Islamic 
state in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood quickly gained strength during its first years. In 
the 1940s the Islamist movement became an influential and powerful political movement. 
However, in the following decade, increasing differences with the ruling Free Officers 
Movement led to an intense crackdown, which pushed the Muslim Brotherhood into 
probably its darkest period. On one side, state repression threatened the movement’s very 
existence. On the other, this period saw the emergence of a deep-rooted, internal struggle 
that divided the movement into a moderate and a radical wing. The latter eventually 
broke away and formed a new generation of radicals outside the confines of the Muslim 
Brotherhood. Many of today’s radical Islamic organizations directly originate or connect 
with the strong ideological roots of this generation. This split marked the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s decision to reject violence and pursue a non-violent and moderate path to 
achieve its objectives. 
This historical event remains important for two reasons. First, it is an example of 
a decisive transition of an Islamist organization with occasionally radical tendencies into 
a non-violent, moderate organization. Analyzing this organizational split establishes a 
theoretical framework that is useful for considering the development of other radical 
Islamist movements. Second, with regard to recent political developments in Egypt, this 
history arouses great interest in the lively discussion among politicians about the role of 
the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt’s future, based on the perception that the Brotherhood 
presents a threat to democratic development. This chapter focuses on the Brotherhood’s 
history and seeks an answer to the question: Why did the Muslim Brotherhood split into a 
moderate and a radical wing in the Nasser era?  
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Some scholars consider ideological change as the most influential factor leading 
to the breakaway of radicals; others regard the crackdown of the regime as a possible 
explanation. Yet, others take a comprehensive approach and assume the concurrence of 
different factors in their case studies. It is not the idea of this chapter to critically review 
the existing literature on the topic. Rather, this research seeks to explain the internal 
schism of the Muslim Brotherhood by means of a comprehensive approach based on 
organizational theory. This approach assumes that any Islamist organization, like other 
organizations, is significantly influenced by extrinsic and intrinsic factors. 
In the course of this chapter, it will become clear that the split of the Muslim 
Brotherhood into two wings cannot be reduced to one factor. Furthermore, both extrinsic 
and intrinsic factors had a significant influence on the division. The elements considered 
had various weights and influences on each other. Therefore, a complex correlation of 
leadership weakness, external state repression, and ideological views will be examined 
and presented as the solution to the given research question.   
The following section provides a rough overview of the major developments that 
led to an increasing internal chasm between the Brothers, split the Muslim Brotherhood 
into two camps, and eventually caused the radical members to break away. Next, external 
and internal factors will be analyzed. The section seeks to explain this outcome from a 
theoretical perspective by discussing a broad spectrum of influential factors, relying on 
secondary literature for examples and insight into the nexus. 
B. HISTORICAL REVIEW 
After the founding of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hasan al-Banna focused on 
consolidating the young organization’s strength by establishing a strong social network 
and conducting missionary work. His objectives changed in the 1930s. By the end of this 
decade, the Islamists entered the political field, expanded, and followed a path of open, 
violent opposition to British influence and increased involvement in the Palestine-Jewish 
conflict. In 1948, the MB participated in the war in Palestine, fighting against secular 
parties and attacking government officials with the help of well-trained Brothers 
returning from the battlefield. Al-Banna no longer hesitated to openly express his anti-
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Zionist, anti-imperial, and anti-secular sentiments. However, the assassination of the 
Egyptian prime minister forced government officials to react, and in 1949 al-Banna was 
assassinated in retaliation.14 
The elimination of their charismatic leader and subsequent arrests of thousands of 
Brothers hit the organization hard and led the MB into a period of political factionalism. 
Led by al-Banna’s successor, Supreme Guide15 Hasan Isma’il al-Hudaybi, who 
represented an uneasy compromise among factions, the MB reorganized and sought 
cooperation against the monarchy with the Free Officers Movement (FOM). This 
partnership, based on years of good relations16 between the military and Islamists, was 
the driving force behind the end of the Egyptian monarchy on July 23, 1952. The MB 
enabled the FOM’s coup d’état by acting both as a security force preventing external 
intervention and as a protector ensuring the safe disappearance of the coup’s leaders in 
case of a failure.17 
However, the honeymoon between the two conspiring groups was short. The main 
problem was that there was no common understanding of the character of the future 
government. From their ideological perspective, the MB looked forward to the 
establishment of an Islamic state, or at least the strong influence of divine law in a future 
secular state. But the FOM was interested neither in a theocratic state nor strong MB 
influence in government matters and, consequently, rejected these ideas. Furthermore, al-
Hudaybi’s attitude and single-handed political undertakings were perceived as opposing 
Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser’s revolutionary FOM, and provoked reactions that drove 
the wedge even deeper between the former allies. The Brothers’ disunity and al-
Hudaybi’s lack of skilled leadership eventually led to an attempt by MB members to 
                                                 
14 Christina Phelps Harris, Nationalism and Revolution in Egypt: The Role of the Muslim Brotherhood 
(Westport:  Hyperion Press Inc., 1981), 177–185. Brynjar Lia, The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt 
– The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement (Reading: Garnet Publishing Ltd., 2010), Ch. 8. Richard P. 
Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 58–79.  
15 Depending on the source General Guide or the Arab word murshid is used synonymously. 
16 The relationship was mainly based on common participation in the recent war in Palestine against 
Israel, training of the MB by the military and several officers’ membership in the Islamist movement. 
Pursuing their ideological objectives, the Islamists were also increasingly opposed to monarchy and 
imperialism and saw a chance in conspiring with the Free Officers to affect their goals. 
17 Mitchell, Muslim Brothers, 92–96, 101–104. Harris, Nationalism, 196. 
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assassinate Nasser. The failure of the assassination led to a massive crackdown on the 
Islamists. As a consequence, the MB leadership was imprisoned, many members were 
executed, and hundreds received prison sentences. This almost put an end to the 
movement’s very existence.18 
The experiences from Nasser’s crackdown, which also led to massive abuse and 
torture of the Brothers in prison, and the secular, nationalistic, and authoritarian politics 
of the regime influenced Sayyid Qutb, the Society’s foremost ideologue of the 1950s and 
1960s. Initially, like many Brothers a supporter of Nasser, Qutb was sorely disappointed 
in Egypt’s development under Nasser. Based on his experiences, he assumed a hostile 
attitude towards the regime and pursued a more radical and violent approach to achieving 
the vision of an Islamic state. His book Ma’alim fi al-Tariq (Milestones), published 
during his 1964 imprisonment, clearly outlined his thoughts and became the ideological 
guide for an emerging radical Islamist movement.19  
Qutb’s ideas kindled a discussion about the MB’s future ideological development, 
which ultimately became a decision for or against a more radical path. Al-Hudaybi and 
his followers formed an opposition to Qutb. They pursued a less radical objective and 
published their thoughts in the work Preachers, not Judges in 1977. However, their 
broader objective was not to criticize Qutb’s ideological heritage, but rather to focus on 
moderating imprisoned and radicalized members. Moreover, the book was a clear stance 
against “…the ideology of radical Islamist movements.”20 Preachers, not Judges offered 




                                                 
18 Harris, Nationalism, 197–203. Mitchell, Muslim Brothers, Ch. 5. Christian Wolff, Die ägyptische 
Muslimbruderschaft: Von der Utopie zur Realpolitik (Hamburg: Diplomica Verlag GmbH, 2008), 39–40. 
19 Barbara Zollner, “Prison Talk: The Muslim Brotherhood’s Internal Struggle during Gamal Abdel 
Nasser’s Persecution, 1954 to 1971,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 39 (2007): 413–414. 
Robert S. Leiken and Steven Brooke, “The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood,” Foreign Affairs 86 
(March/April 2007): 109. Barbara Zollner, The Muslim Brotherhood: Hasan al-Hudaybi and ideology 
(New York: Routledge, 2009), 31–39.  
20 Zollner, Muslim Brotherhood, 71.  
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a certain degree successful in convincing some members to return and abide by a 
moderate path. Nevertheless, some proponents of Qutb’s radical ideas broke away from 
the MB.21 
C. FACTORS FACILITATING THE SPLIT INTO TWO BRANCHES 
As explained in the introduction, this analysis will focus on elements from 
organizational theory. Consequently, the variables that are considered important in 
answering the research question are divided into extrinsic and intrinsic factors, which are 
again divided into subcategories. This will not only allow a broad spectrum of possible 
influences on the division of the movement to be covered, but also a clear allocation of 
findings with regard to external and internal impacts. In short, this approach ensures a 
comprehensive consideration of the MB divide into the radical and the moderate camp in 
the 1960s and 1970s. 
1. Extrinsic Factors 
In this context, external factors are understood as variables shaping the 
environment of an organization politically, legally, culturally, and socially. The following 
paragraphs analyze the effects of state repression and other political, social, and cultural 
factors on the internal split of the MB. Extrinsic and intrinsic factors may also interact to 
a certain degree, and a close look at links between them is important for further analysis. 
a. Repression 
Mohammed Hafez’s studies have shown that a repressive environment 
may cause a violent response from Islamist movements to protect the well-being of the 
organization.22 The crackdown on the MB and the following phases of repression—
including imprisonment, torture, exile, and condemnation—should be considered from 
this point of view. The near eradication of the MB led to further radicalization of parts of 
the organization. As mentioned, Qutb—the driving ideological force of the organization 
                                                 
21 Ashour,  De-Radicalization, 85. Zollner, “Prison Talk,” 420, 424–425.  
22 Mohammed M. Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World 
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2003), Ch. 3. 
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during these years—was strongly influenced by these experiences. He used his studies, 
teachings, and writings to spread his belief in more radical and even violent approaches 
to Islamist objectives. Due to a good support network provided by his family and the 
Muslim Sisterhood, Qutb managed not only to reach his fellow Islamist inmates in 
prisons, but also the remains of the MB leadership and fellow Brothers hiding in the 
underground network.23 
Qutb’s ideas were very popular and influenced many members of the MB. 
Consequently, he was asked to become the spiritual leader of Organization 1965, a group 
of formerly imprisoned members of the MB who supported his views. His propagandistic 
writing became the foundation of the educational outreach of the new group, which was 
striving towards Islamist activism. They considered themselves the true believers and 
Islamic vanguard against misguided leaders and regimes, following the path of jahiliyyah 
(ignorance of divine guidance) that Qutb had addressed in Milestones. However, as Qutb 
had foreseen in Milestones, as soon as Organization 1965 was detected by Nasser’s 
regime, a new wave of repression overtook the MB. Organization 1965 members were 
brought to court and “…accused of planning to overthrow the state system.”24 Qutb was 
among others sentenced to death and hanged in August 1966, thereby becoming, in the 
eyes of his followers, a prophet and also a martyr for jihad. The perception of his death as 
a martyrdom, along with the fresh phase of repression, strengthened the Qutbists and 
other radical and militant Islamist movements.25 
Nevertheless, scholars like Omar Ashour add a further key factor to 
Hafez’s findings about how repression can decisively turn the course of events. Ashour 
believes that repression can also help de-radicalize Islamist movements that are utilizing 
violence to achieve their goals. He argues that short phases of repression cause 
radicalization, while intense and sustained repression may indeed provoke a moderately 
oriented rethinking of among Islamist leadership. This turn for the better is based on 
                                                 
23 Zollner, Muslim Brotherhood, 41–42. 
24 Zollner, “Prison Talks,” 419. 
25 Ibid., 418. Leiken and Brooke, “Moderate Muslim Brotherhood,” 110. Sayyid Qutb, Milestones, 
accessed November 7, 2010, 
http://www.izharudeen.com/uploads/4/1/2/2/4122615/milestones_www.izharudeen.com.pdf, 7, 63.  
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consideration of the costs of protracted violence and the theological legitimacy of 
violence. Therefore, Ashour believes that leadership in such a repressive environment 
probably tips the scales decisively.26 
In the case of the MB, al-Hudaybi often showed his opposition to violence 
as a means of achieving the MB’s objectives. Besides his stance against the Secret 
Apparatus and radical members in his early years as the Supreme Guide of the Brothers, 
he opposed violent engagement and preferred a moderate path during his leadership. 
Furthermore, although extent of al-Hudaybi’s backing of the founding of Organization 
1965 remains unclear, it is believed that he agreed to it under the condition that its 
members would not use violent means. It was also al-Hudaybi who took a clear stand 
against the violent path of the Qutbists’ ideas when he later distanced himself from 
Organization 1965 and all its activities. Al-Hudaybi and his followers opted for a 
moderate path to establishing an Islamic state in accordance with al-Banna’s ideology. 
For them, a change of society could only be accomplished by the education of the people 
and the missionary teaching of true Islam. Furthermore, “violence…would compromise 
the integrity of the Brotherhood’s mission and jeopardize its future.”27 This rethinking 
presented a good solution to avoiding the costs of violence and rebuilding the 
organization. Salvaging the MB’s reputation in the eyes of the state—in order to avoid 
further harm to his fellow Brothers and to save them from the cruel experiences of 
Egyptian prisons—turned out to be a further goal of his moderate attitude. Many 
supported this notion because after all their bitter, repressive experiences they wanted to 
get on with their lives.28  
Based on these findings, and not only on the Supreme Guide’s 
recommendation, there was obviously sufficient willingness to initiate a moderate path. 
Al-Hudaybi also sensed that the sustained repression would harm the MB extremely and 
                                                 
26 Ashour, De-Radicalization, 138–139. 
27 John Calvert, Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2010), 229. 
28 Alison Pargeter, The Muslim Brotherhood: The Burden of Tradition (Saint Paul: Saqi Books, 2010), 
31–36. Calvert, Sayyid Qutb, 229, 274–276. Zollner, Muslim Brotherhood, 45–46. Mitchell, Muslim 
Brothers, 87–88. 
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in case of further repression, the Islamists would pay a high price. However, the findings 
in this section have shown that the state’s repression had two different effects on the MB 
and added to the internal division of the movement. Furthermore, in this case the 
repressive phases the MB experienced under Nasser in the 1950s and 1960s triggered 
Qutb’s and al-Hudaybi’s ideological orientation. Thus, state repression seems to have 
been a decisive factor with regard to the research question. Nevertheless, al-Hudaybi’s 
leadership role needs to be intensively assessed when dealing with intrinsic factors. As 
established above, MB leadership was obviously not able to convince all its members to 
pursue moderate ideas and prevent the breakaway of radicals. This implies that leadership 
played an important and influential role during the repression of the MB and facilitated 
the movement’s split. 
b. External Political, Cultural, and Social Influences 
During his presidency, Nasser gained enormous respect in Egypt and the 
Arab world. His policies pursued a secular, nationalistic, and authoritarian path and 
called for unity in open rejection of imperialist and Zionist influences. This found broad 
support throughout the region. Sympathizers admired Nasser’s charismatic plea and 
action against the states embodying and supporting these ideologies. His idea of a 
unifying Arab nationalism developed into a success story, but massively marginalized the 
significance of Islam in daily life. However, Qutb and his followers completely opposed 
the Nasser regime and its policies. From their ideological point of view, he was an 
illegitimate leader. Even the Six-Day War in 1967 against an external, non-Muslim 
enemy, Israel, did not change their opinion. The radicals were unwilling to support a 
jahili leader under any circumstances.29 
The moderate camp had a different opinion. They did not deny that Nasser 
had done wrong in the past by betraying the Brothers’ Islamist cause after the coup d’état. 
They resented that the state under Nasser distanced itself more and more from their ideal 
of an Islamic state under divine rule. Nonetheless, opposing the radicals’ ideological 
beliefs, al-Hudaybi’s moderate faction did not query Nasser’s confessional status as a 
                                                 
29 Zollner, Muslim Brotherhood, 39, 45–46. 
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Muslim. Additionally, Nasser at least fought a common, non-Muslim enemy, which 
outweighed, in this case, their resentments. As a result, the moderate faction rallied in 
support of Nasser’s war against Israel.30 
At first glance, the fatal outcome of the Six-Day War, which ended in an 
immense defeat for the Arabs, seemed to prove the Qutbists right in their perception of 
the consequences of jahiliyyah to a Muslim society. For them, the striking Jewish victory 
was the logical “consequence of the Muslims’ disobedience towards God…[and if]…the 
Arab states [had] waged the war along Islamic lines, God would have assured their 
victory.”31  
It is undisputed that al-Naska (The Setback), as the war was called in the 
Arab world, caused deep scars to the Egyptian psyche, economy, and reputation in the 
Middle East. Furthermore, due to this Egyptian defeat, Nasser’s idea of Arab nationalism 
eventually came to an abrupt end. Rachel Scott gets to the heart of the debacle’s impact 
on Egypt’s secular leadership when she writes that “it shattered the belief that the answer 
to Arab backwardness, dependence, and poverty lay in [Arab] unity.”32 Furthermore, the 
frustration and stressful military experience of many returning soldiers promoted anger 
and violent tendencies within Egyptian society.33 
Experiencing dislocation and disconnection, many Egyptians found refuge 
in Islam; and while Arab nationalism slowly faded away, Islamic streams filled the 
ideological gap. Islamist groups, and especially the MB, preached al-Banna’s ideas and 
solutions to escape a secular society’s misery, and experienced a political revival. 
Nevertheless, it is difficult to concretely determine whether the radical or the moderate 
Islamist movement was more popular by putting a figure to it.34 
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It is safe to assume that both sides met the sympathies of new supporters 
and gained further strength. But just as external factors strengthened both sides, their 
different interpretations, based on differing ideological beliefs, increased the cleft 
between them. All this indicates that external political, social, and even cultural 
influences had at least a marginal impact on the MB’s split. Furthermore, these external 
variables were decisively shaped by ideological convictions.   
2. Intrinsic Factors 
Internal factors, such as leadership, motivation, learning receptivity, values 
(cultural or ideological), generational shifts, conflicts, and formal structures also 
represent important characteristics that affect the intrinsic motivation to adapt or deny a 
certain policy or path. With regard to the topic of this chapter, they may present reasons 
for the breakaway of the radical Islamists. The following paragraphs will especially 
assess leadership, organizational structure, and ideological aspects. As mentioned, some 
of these are subject to the external influences described above. 
a. Leadership and Organizational Structure 
When al-Hudaybi was appointed as the Supreme Guide of the MB, he 
took over a difficult heritage. Al-Banna had been a charismatic leader who was able to 
cast a spell over his followers by promoting a sense of personal friendship. He convinced 
others with deep energetic commitment, exemplary behavior, inspiration, selflessness, 
humility, and administrative and organizational talent. The founder of the MB was a 
preacher for the Islamist cause and ideological objectives. Al-Banna was surrounded by 
an aura of trust and was able to appeal to all Egyptians, no matter their social and 
intellectual background.35 
Nevertheless, al-Banna expected that the Brothers accept his concept of 
leadership and discipline. His followers had to swear an oath of loyalty to his person. 
This meant confidence in his leadership and absolute obedience. Along with such 
disciplinary procedures and the strictly hierarchical structure of the movement, al-
                                                 
35 Mitchell, Muslim Brothers, 295–299. 
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Banna’s leadership showed almost authoritarian traits. He encouraged young and 
ambitious members by a system of promotion or other incentives and additionally, 
installed a bureaucratic structure within the hierarchical organization to ensure a system 
of continuous checks and balances that strengthened his position.36 
Al-Banna’s assassination in 1949 was a heavy burden for the MB. The 
question of succession led to the formation of three different factions within the 
movement. First, there was the conservative group, headed by the late General Guide’s 
brother. Then, there was a militant activist or extremist faction, led by one of the most 
militant of the Brothers, Salah al-Ashmawi. He was also editor and publisher of the 
magazine al-Da’wa and acted as an interim leader of the Brethren till the new General 
Guide was elected. The last group was represented by moderate and nationally 
recognized Muslim Brothers who favored a politically accepted and moderate Supreme 
Guide at the helm.37  
Al-Hudaybi’s appointment as the General Guide two years after al-
Banna’s death was mainly based on a compromise between these three factions. He was a 
respected judge and a loyal friend and legal advisor of his predecessor. However, al-
Hudaybi’s leadership was not undisputed among the ranks. Already, at the beginning of 
his command, he struggled with factionalism and was not able to unite the different 
camps. Early on, he proved to be a weak leader who had, indeed, political talent but 
lacked al-Banna’s charismatic personality and leadership. This weakness was just what 
his opponents within the MB, particularly the radical al-Ashmawi, were waiting for. In 
the following years, al-Hudaybi met strong resistance when he tried to secure his position 
by removing opponents belonging to the extremist camp, and Brothers often ignored his 
orders, a clear sign of disrespect.38  
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The continuous internal schism within the Muslim Brotherhood was 
further fueled by al-Hudaybi’s organizational changes. Some parts of the organization, 
such as the Guidance Office, were strengthened, and the Supreme Guide’s influence 
declined. Furthermore, al-Hudaybi focused on abandoning the militant wing, which also 
caused internal struggle. These reforms explain why some Brothers perceived al-
Hudaybi’s leadership style as that of a political-party leader, in strong contrast with al-
Banna, who was perceived as the head of a family.39 
Internal schism and al-Hudaybi’s inability to unify the Brothers in a 
common cause continued until a couple of years before his death. At least in his stance 
against the emerging radical movement within the MB, he succeeded in winning other 
leading members to his moderate path. But even then, many criticized his leadership. 
These members remained neutral in the dispute between the other two groups. Their 
position was also a moderate one, following al-Banna’s visions of an Islamic state and its 
establishment. However, they were simply unconvinced of the Supreme Guide’s 
leadership and were unable to unreservedly support his stand. Furthermore, concerning 
the authorship of Preachers, not Judges, it should be noted that the creation and content 
of the work were influenced by several thinkers in al-Hudaybi’s social environment. A 
good argument can be made that, even in the matter of his book, al-Hudaybi was not an 
influential and dominating figure who pulled the strings. Instead, his fellow Brothers 
probably pushed him in this direction, as some of them did when pursuing the revival of 
the MB in earlier years. Overall, al-Hudaybi left the impression of being passive.40 
Quite in contrast to al-Hudaybi, Qutb emerged in the 1950s and 1960s as 
the ideological leader of the MB and amply filled the gap that the new Supreme Guide 
had opened after taking the helm. Qutb’s feelings of disappointment, bitterness, and 
hatred, as well as his experiences in prison, were shared by many Brothers. The ideas he 
developed during his imprisonment attracted many others who were willing to revive the 
MB and stand up against the enemy embodied by Nasser’s regime. Like the founder of 
the MB, Qutb started to introduce his views of Islam and interpretations of the Qur’an to 
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 25
his environment, his fellow Brothers in his prison. As his next step, he started to teach 
and preach his ideas and managed to spread them beyond the prison walls by using a 
support network. In this way, he further assimilated the identity of the late al-Banna and 
attracted even more supporters.41 
Despite his rising popularity, Qutb abided by his loyalty to al-Hudaybi for 
a long time. It was al-Hudaybi who unilaterally recruited him in the 1950s for a coveted 
place on the Guidance Council. The Brothers disliked these dictatorial ways of decision 
making that introduced organizational outsiders into high positions. This was an internal 
measure used at their expense, circumventing the conventional rise through promotion 
according to merit. Though al-Hudaybi once more prompted internal criticism, on the 
other hand, he pushed one of his loyal supporters into a more leading position, which was 
quite beneficial for him. Qutb started working on the Propagation of the Call Department 
for the MB and proved his loyalty by supporting al-Hudaybi’s cause in department 
publications.42 
During his missionary teaching in prison, some older members of the 
leadership accused Qutb of undercutting the Supreme Guide’s authority and spreading 
questionable ideological views. To his critics, only al-Hudaybi was eligible to introduce 
ideological changes and provide spiritual advice and guidance. In their eyes, Qutb had 
crossed a line, and they questioned his loyalty. Still, Qutb was able to explain himself and 
his views and some of his critics accepted his explanations. A reason for this may be the 
fact that Qutb’s activism helped restore the MB and presented a way out of their 
traumatic experiences and inability to act due to state repression. Nevertheless, others did 
not accept this and remained cautious, which in some way marks the beginning of the 
MB’s division.43 
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Qutb remained sincere in his loyalty to al-Hudaybi and accepted his 
leadership as the Supreme Guide of the Brothers based on the MB’s leadership structure. 
Even when the Guide’s actions were limited due to the repression, he did not question al-
Hudaybi’s lead or support a change of leadership. However, this changed when Qutb 
became the spiritual leader of Organization 1965.  According to John Calvert, “in [the] 
face of Hudaybi’s relative political impotence, Qutb had no choice but to make important 
decisions regarding the secret organization on his own.”44 Thereby, not only did al-
Hudaybi’s influence in Qutb’s doings decline, but when Organization 1965 pursued a 
more violent and radical path to achieve its goals, Qutb also disobeyed the Supreme 
Guide. The latter had agreed on the group’s foundation only under the condition that its 
members follow a moderate and non-violent path. This shows clearly that the loyal 
relationship between al-Hudaybi and Qutb was detrimentally affected.45   
Different conclusions can here be drawn. First, the MB’s lack of 
acceptance of al-Hudaybi in the post of the Supreme Guide and his continuous inability 
to unify the movement weakened the organization against external influences, led to a 
lack of control over the Brothers and left room for further factionalism, which facilitated 
a probable breakaway of interest groups. Second, the Supreme Guide’s bias for advocacy 
policy, his drab and dull appearance, and his relative political impotence and inactivity 
encouraged an atmosphere of departure and a desire for a new charismatic leader with 
fresh ideas. Finally Qutb, who was long a loyal supporter of al-Hudaybi, became the icon 
of this departure and, therefore, emerged as a competitor. Third, indecisiveness among 
the MB leadership and a lack of clear authority facilitated the emergence of a radical 
subgroup.  
Fourth, organizational changes reduced the influence and power of the 
Supreme Guide tremendously, which unleashed opposing forces. However, due to Qutb’s 
long-term loyalty, this argument can be eliminated as a cause for the internal divide. At 
best, one can assume that internal forces in the extremist camp of the organization were 
easily attracted to Qutb’s ideas. Fifth, a generational shift as a driving factor for the split 
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within the MB can be excluded for the most part. Certainly, young reactionary forces felt 
attracted by Qutb’s ideas and supported him, but the radical, moderate, and conservative 
streams were always a part of the MB’s identity and were not introduced or revived by a 
new generation of Brothers. Instead, the intensification of radical thought was rooted in 
Qutb’s ideological framework and especially attracted other prisoners suffering the same 
tortures.  
These findings show that the leadership played an important role in the 
split of the MB. However, this factor is closely connected to repressive and ideological 
influences. The latter will be considered in the following section. There, the two main 
ideological streams of the time, which were pursued by Qutb and al-Hudaybi and their 
respective followers, and their possible impact on the internal divide of the MB will be 
analyzed.   
b. Ideological Considerations 
Sayyid Qutb digested his experiences with the Nasser regime and its 
repressive actions in his book Milestones. The writing was based on his interpretation of 
the Qur’an and served as guidance for his idea of a vanguard to initiate Islamic revival in 
the Muslim world. He believed that every aspect of life is focused on following God’s 
divine will by internalizing the Islamic principles of tawhid (there is no God but Allah) 
and hakimiyyat Allah (God is sovereign on earth). All Muslims must be convinced of 
these Islamic principles and apply them in their way of life. From Qutb’s perspective, 
modern living had led Muslim societies to jahiliyyah (ignorance of the divine guidance) 
by obeying secular leaders or authorities instead of God. Therefore, Qutb and his 
followers called for takfir (excommunication) of Muslims following jahili influences. 
This meant declaring them a kafir (nonbeliever). The Qutbists perceived themselves as an 
Islamist vanguard movement of true believers. These radicals believed that the use of 
 28
violence was legitimate in order to fight all influences of a jahili society and establish an 
Islamic state. Even the concept of jihad was not excluded from achieving this goal.46  
Al-Hudaybi and the members of his Guidance Council predicted harmful 
consequences to the MB if the organization followed Qutb’s views. In Preachers, not 
Judges, they offered alternative considerations of the three central concepts of radical 
Islamist interpretation. First, the concept takfir lost relevance if used to condemn an 
individual or a whole society, because the profession of faith (shahada) was considered 
the only valid principle in determining whether an individual is a Muslim or not. Once a 
person professes his faith, he must be accepted as a Muslim and part of the Muslim 
community unless he publicly renounces belief. Therefore, no human being is able to 
pass a judgment on another individual’s belief or declare a Muslim a kafir. This 
judgment, as well as the absolution of sins, is up to God. As a result, participation in 
Islamist activism, of whatever kind, cannot determine whether a person is a believer or 
not.47 
Second, the book points out that Islamic scholars like Abul Ala Mawdudi 
were wrong in their assumption that human failure has led to misunderstanding of the 
Qur’an and Sunna. The reason is that the word of God, presented in the Qur’an, was 
never lost and always present to Muslims. Thereby, a century-long misunderstanding of 
the most important Islamic writings must be excluded as the reason for the present 
existence of a jahili society. The moderates concluded that Mawdudi’s conclusion about 
the concept of jahiliyyah was incorrect, and thus took away another ideological basis of 
the radicals.48  
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Finally, the concept of God’s absolute sovereignty on earth was reviewed. 
Preachers, not Judges assesses that Islamic law, shari’a, is not fixed but leaves room for 
flexibility and offers men a capacity of decision making in the regulation of social life 
(self-determination). As long as this self-determination does not violate religious 
obligations, it does not challenge divine governance or God’s sovereignty. Additionally, 
applying God’s rule to Muslims’ daily lives is important and fundamental. Al-Hudaybi 
argued that it would be too far reaching to align secular laws in a rigid way according to 
the principle of God’s sovereignty and shari’a without further excogitation.49     
Both writings symbolize the opposing sides of the unbridgeable 
ideological gap between the radical and moderate camps. There was no room for 
compromise or possibility of rapprochement. Unification was not an option. 
Consequently, according to Barbara Zollner, al-Hudaybi and his moderate entourage 
focused on Muslim Brothers who were still indecisive about whether to follow the 
moderate or the radical path. Preachers, not Judges aimed at persuading these members, 
often still imprisoned, to choose the nonviolent alternative to the radical and 
uncompromising path of the Qutbists. There were only a few radical hardliners that could 
be convinced to return to the moderate fold.50 
Ultimately, this ideological showdown forced all Brothers to make a 
decision for or against greater radicalism. It becomes clear that al-Hudaybi and Qutb 
pursued the same objective of an Islamic state by different means, based on their 
ideological stance—teaching versus violence. These ideological views were another 
important factor that eventually led to the split of the MB. However, they were triggered 
by the Brothers’ experiences of a repressive Egyptian environment that eventually 
provoked either hatred and violence or a will to ensure survival by denying violence.  
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D. CONCLUSION 
As this analysis of extrinsic and intrinsic factors has shown, state repression and 
the leadership skills of the Supreme Guide al-Hudaybi played a major role in facilitating 
the split of the MB into two wings. External repression provoked two different effects: 
first, al-Hudaybi saw the need to steer the MB back into shallow waters to secure its 
survival. In his eyes, this meant treading a moderate path by avoiding further violent 
confrontation with the regime and focusing on teaching and education. Second, Qutb 
chose a violent and more radical path. For him, teaching and education were not enough 
to establish an Islamic state. Jahiliyyah had to be met with force.  
However, the Supreme Guide’s weak leadership was also an important factor. Al-
Hudaybi failed to unite the MB and prevent factionalism, especially during the 
repression. Furthermore, he never initiated a revival by himself. The attempts to revive 
the MB in its deepest crisis were always initiated by motivated Brothers who merely 
requested his approval to legitimize their cause—the founding of Organization 1965 is a 
good example. The repression and restriction on the Brothers’ communications is not a 
sufficient explanation for this leadership failure. Even Qutb was able to use a good 
support network during his imprisonment to spread his ideas inside and outside the prison 
walls. Additionally, Qutb was a charismatic leader and suffered the same bitter 
experiences as many other Brothers, which attracted a lot of supporters. He was able to 
spark hopes for a strong revival of the MB, something that al-Hudaybi failed to do.  
The ideological views that Qutb created out of his frustration, bitterness, and 
interpretation of the Qur’an left no room for compromises or possibility of 
rapprochement. His ideology sealed the fate of the MB and left a divided organization. 
Preachers, not Judges was only a drop in the bucket and a means to convince those 
Brothers who were still indecisive—not least because of their criticism of al-Hudaybi’s 
leadership—about what path to take. If al-Hudaybi had introduced some ideological 
views providing a solution or a future objective for the MB much earlier during the crisis, 
a split might have been avoided.  
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The role of other external events had at best a marginal influence on the split. If 
anything, they increased the cleft between both camps, which was already promoted by 
differing ideological views. Apart from that, they played no major role. 
This chapter has shown the importance of the effects of external repression and 
organizational leadership in the case of the MB split. If Supreme Guide al-Hudaybi had 
been stronger and provided a better ideological framework during times of crisis, the split 
might have been avoided. However, the failures and weakness of leadership tipped the 
scales and facilitated the emergence of a radical wing that produced many of the radical 
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III. POLITICAL MODERATION IN THE SADAT ERA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Gamal Abdel Nasser’s death marked the end of the Muslim Brotherhood’s darkest 
period since its founding, a period that almost ended its existence. Anwar Sadat, who 
succeeded this chief ideologist of Arab nationalism, turned away from his predecessor’s 
policies. As president of Egypt, Sadat pursued a path of liberal politics domestically and a 
realigned foreign policy aimed at Egypt’s financial betterment, based on economic 
openness towards the West and peace with Israel. The new regime’s domestic politics 
were strongly influenced by a revival of Islamic sectarian sentiment throughout Egyptian 
society. Sadat utilized this atmosphere in his pursuit of legitimacy and regime 
consolidation. He opted for a pious self-portrayal and a more central role of Islam in 
politics and society.  
This presented the perfect conditions for a revival of Islamic and Islamist 
movements that had lost ground during the decade-long dominance of secularism under 
Nasser. Sadat’s reforms offered vital momentum and freedom that Islamists, especially, 
used to exert their influence in society and politics. Based on these circumstances also, 
radical trends managed to gain a foothold after Nasser’s relentless repression. However, 
the Muslim Brotherhood did not back that horse. Despite some more radical groupings 
lurking within the movement and periodic tendencies historically towards the violent 
pursuit of objectives, the organization abided by its moderate path. Even increasing 
differences with the ruling regime did not present sufficient reason for the Brotherhood to 
resort to radical means. This chapter focuses on this phenomenon of the Brethren’s 
history and seeks an answer to the question: Why did the Muslim Brotherhood 
consolidate its moderate path in the Sadat era? 
Many scholars have described the relationship between the Sadat regime and the 
Muslim Brotherhood during the 1970s, and they present valuable references to different 
aspects and factors that influenced the Brothers’ orientation during the Sadat era. 
However, so far a comprehensive analysis of the motives of the movement has never 
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been performed. This chapter will close this gap by examining the writings of different 
authors. Furthermore, knowledge about the influence of extrinsic and intrinsic factors, 
which is based on organizational theory, will be used to explain the Brethren’s decision. 
Carrie Rosefsky Wickham’s idea of “Islamist auto-reform” will be considered. She 
argues that an organization’s participation in politics influences its behavior and 
orientation. This chapter will show that the Muslim Brotherhood’s intention to deny 
violence was caused by different factors that influenced each other significantly. After 
some paragraphs presenting a historical review of the Sadat era, the following sections 
will describe the impact of the new and old regimes’ policies, generational and 
ideological influences, and the massive role of leadership, which consolidated the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s moderate path.   
B. HISTORICAL REVIEW 
The Six-Day War in 1967 ended in an immense defeat for the Arabs. Egypt 
suffered the biggest loss on the Arab side. Its army was destroyed and two major sources 
of revenue were lost: the Suez Canal was under Israeli control for an indefinite time and 
the precious Sinai oil fields were seized by the Israeli Defense Forces. As a side effect of 
the military engagements, tourism decreased drastically, making the financial injury 
worse. Furthermore, the Arab world, especially Egypt, had to digest an awful 
humiliation. Gamal Abdel Nasser, the messianic leader of the pan-Arabic nationalism 
movement and president of the Arabs’ strongest military power, lost face. Bearing the 
consequences of this military and economic disaster, he intended to resign. But the 
Egyptians, who were afraid to suffer further defeat and foreign domination, supported 
their charismatic leader and convinced Nasser to remain in office. During the following 
years of his presidency, Egypt never managed to recover from the fatal outcome of the 
Six-Day War. Although Soviet support ensured a rapid recovery of military strength, the 
country was financially ruined.51 
                                                 
51 Michael B. Oren, Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East (New 
York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 2002), 305–306, 310–312. Benny Morris, Righteous Victims: A 
History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881–2001 (New York: Vintage Books, 2001), 344, 347. Eugene 
Rogan, The Arabs: A History (New York: Basic Books, 2009), 340. 
 35
After his death in 1970, Nasser left his successor a difficult heritage. Anwar Sadat 
had to deal with a rather delicate mix of financial problems and strong public discontent 
with the consequences of Egypt’s humiliation, and had to face some decisive challenges. 
The new president was considered a weak leader—Nasser’s lapdog—and despite being a 
member of the Free Officers’ Movement, had the backing of neither the military nor the 
Egyptians. Therefore, Sadat had to legitimize his presidency, secure his position against 
his opponents, win the hearts and minds of the Egyptians, and eventually improve 
Egypt’s economic problems, which were mainly based on the ongoing and insoluble 
conflict with Israel, creating vast military costs.52 
To secure his political position, he had to remove his opponents. First were direct 
political opponents like former Egyptian Vice President Ali Sabri, a communist. Sabri 
followed the Nasserist thought that only war would solve Egypt’s problems. In contrast to 
Sabri, Sadat was less optimistic about the chances of winning against Israel. He wanted to 
give diplomacy a chance. After Sadat’s first peace initiative failed in 1971, due to Israel’s 
unwillingness to enter into negotiations, Sabri and his supporters challenged the 
president. Sadat ordered the arrest of about ninety plotters who were sentenced to life 
imprisonment, and, thus managed to put his opponents away by what was called Sadat’s 
“corrective revolution.”53 
Second, there was the political left, like Socialists, Marxists and Nasserists, as 
well as the extreme right, represented by radical groups that Egypt’s new president had to 
deal with. The Setback put an end to Nasser’s idea of Arab nationalism and gave birth to 
a revival of religion in public life. Sadat used this sectarian development to legitimize his 
presidency. He was constantly seen in prayer, and the prayer’s mark on his forehead 
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represented a symbol of deep religiosity. Islam became a tool to project and promote his 
public self-image of the “believing” president embodying enormous religious piety.54 
Sadat followed a new political path, which allowed a more central role for Islam 
in politics. Religious themes entered political life, as well as decision making in Egypt 
and reached out to every sphere politics could influence. In 1971, for instance, he 
initiated changes to the constitution that made Islam and Islamic jurisprudence even more 
important. At the same time, Sadat took advantage of the Islamist movements in order to 
meet his political opposition. The Islamists were attracted by the sectarian politics and 
offered to be a good tool to secure the young president’s political base by building up a 
strong counterweight against leftist socialist elements and their grassroots on the 
university campuses. In all this, the MB was more than helpful. By granting the Islamist 
movement more and more political freedom, Sadat utilized the MB as an ideological 
opponent against the political left and even the extreme right. Sadat also encouraged the 
development of Islamic student organizations on campuses “to fight against the 
communists.”55 As a result, he managed to neutralize the old and new generations of 
leftist elements in politics and the universities, which had developed during Nasser’s time 
and now opposed Sadat’s government. The different Islamist organizations eventually 
helped Sadat keep the opposition in check.56  
Although the Yom Kippur War in 1973 helped improve Sadat’s political standing 
by rekindling Arab pride and Egyptian leadership in the Arab world, the difficult 
patrimony of his predecessor demanded further developments, especially dealing with 
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Egypt’s financial and economic problems. These problems were mainly based on the 
enormous costs of the ongoing conflict with Israel. Sadat sought to improve the situation 
by establishing a program called al-Infitah, an economic opening to attract Western 
investments. However, there were problems. First, al-Infitah was no real economic 
success story, because it did not benefit all Egyptians as planned and facilitated 
corruption. Second, it met strong Islamist opposition that feared dependency on and the 
influence of the West.57 
Besides the constitutional changes Sadat introduced in the early 1970s, he also 
stressed the supremacy of law in Egypt. He opposed the imprisonment of Egyptians 
based on political and religious beliefs. In the mid-1970s, he pursued further reorientation 
of the national political arena. He finally abandoned Nasser’s one-party system based on 
the Arab Socialist Union and created a kind of restricted three-party pluralism covering 
left, center, and right orientations. By 1977, he created his own party, the National 
Democratic Party, and recognized the New Wafd Party as an additional party of this 
system. However, these changes were motivated by economic and political priorities to 
encourage foreign investment in Egypt and were not part of a broader democratization 
initiative.58 
In the late 1970s, as a consequence of still unsolved economic problems, Sadat 
pursued peace with Israel to eliminate Egypt’s major cause for vast military expenditures. 
Although Sadat had been warned that peace with Israel would have serious 
consequences—the Egyptian people would not accept it and the Arab world would never 
forgive him—he flew to Jerusalem in 1977 and addressed the Israeli Knesset. In his 
speech he proposed a land for peace deal: full acceptance and recognition of the state of 
Israel by the Arab world and a solution of the Palestinian problem for a return of all 
territory occupied by Israel in the Six-Day War.59  
                                                 
57 Cleveland and Bunton, Modern Middle East, 374–382. Ana B. Soage and Jorge F. Franganillo, 
“The Muslim Brothers in Egypt,” in The Muslim Brotherhood: The Organization and Policies of a Global 
Islamist Movement, ed. Barry Rubin (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 43. 
58 Hesham Al-Awadi, In Pursuit of Legitimacy: The Muslim Brothers and Mubarak, 1982–2000 (New 
York: Tauris Academic Studies, 2004), 36. Kassem, Egyptian Politics, 52–53. 
59 Walter Laqueur and Barry Rubin, ed., The Israel-Arab Reader: A Documentary History of the 
Middle East Conflict (New York: Penguin Books, 2008), 207–215. Rogan, The Arabs, 389. 
 38
Only a couple of months later, Israel and Egypt started peace negotiations at 
Camp David. U.S. President Carter acted as a mediator between the two Middle Eastern 
states. The negotiations were tough as leather, and it took more than thirteen days and 
twenty-two drafts to achieve two separate agreements, the Camp David Accords. One 
was a fairly concrete bilateral peace between Israel and Egypt, and the other a rather 
ambiguous framework for Palestinian self-governance. Eventually, both parties signed 
the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty in 1979. Egypt managed to achieve the return of the 
Sinai to Egyptian control, which meant some economic improvements. Additionally, the 
peace settlement ensured welcome U.S. military and economic aid to the Egyptians. But 
the treaty had an unwelcome side effect—Egypt’s expulsion from the Arab League.60  
The consequences of the treaty—clefts among the Arabs and dependence on U.S. 
financial support—turned into a political disaster for Sadat. Its influence on Egyptian 
public opinion strengthened Sadat’s political opponents, including the MB, and also 
empowered radical Islamists within Egypt. Furthermore, 1979 became crucial with 
regards to developments in Iran. Islamic militants and students played an important role 
during the Iranian revolution. As a result, Sadat constrained the influence of student 
unions, which supported their Iranian fellows and denied government funding for Islamic 
organizations. Finally, the Egyptian president offered aid and political asylum to his 
friend, the ousted Shah of Iran, which caused further student unrest and opposition within 
Egypt. Sadat’s domestic policy turned more and more authoritarian until, in 1981, he 
ordered an indiscriminate campaign against all his opponents. These developments 
eventually ended in Sadat’s assassination by radical Islamists in 1981.61 
According to Abd al-Monein Said Aly and Manfred Wenner, the Egyptian 
president and the MB met in four “arenas of conflict.” First, although Sadat had 
                                                 
60 Mohamed Heikal, Autumn of Fury: The Assassination of Sadat (London: André Deutsch Ltd., 
1983), 96–99. William B. Quandt, Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 
1967 (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2005), 177–204. William B. Quandt, Camp David: 
Peacemaking and Politics (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1986), 311–314, 335. 
61 Rogan, The Arabs, 392. Heikal, Autumn of Fury, 173–174, 216–224, 249–255. Sullivan and Abed-
Kotob, Islam in Egypt, 74. Abd al-Monein Said Aly and Manfred W. Wenner, “Modern Islamic Reform 
Movements: The Muslim Brotherhood in Contemporary Egypt,” Middle East Journal 36, no. 3 (Summer, 
1982): 358.  Soage and Franganillo, “Muslim Brothers,” 43. 
 39
introduced party-pluralism, constitutional changes, and Islam’s central role in politics, he 
did not permit the MB’s establishment of an Islamic party. Second, Sadat’s policy of al-
infitah and its flagitious side effects62 did not comply with the MB’s idea of “a righteous 
and moral Islamic society.”63 Third, the new secular and liberal status of women and its 
underpinning laws was counter to the MB’s Islamic interpretation of a woman’s role in 
society. The fourth and last arena of conflict was Sadat’s settlement of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. Egypt’s president tried to solve the long-lasting feud with his peace initiative, 
leading to the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt. However, the Brothers believed that 
it was not legitimate for Sadat to speak for Islam and offer concessions in any dispute 
regarding Palestine. But, despite these enormous differences near the end of Sadat’s 
presidency, the MB abided by a nonviolent and moderate path, intensified its political 
efforts and influence, and resisted the trend towards radicalism that other Islamist 
movements were undergoing.64 
C. REASONS FOR THE CONSOLIDATION 
As explained in this chapter’s introduction, this analysis will primarily focus on 
elements from organizational theory, which means that extrinsic and intrinsic factors and 
their subcategories will be analyzed. Besides the broad spectrum of possible influences 
on the Brothers’ moderate path, Wickham’s idea of Islamist auto-reform also needs to be 
considered for a detailed and comprehensive result. 
1. Extrinsic Factors 
Several external factors shaped the environment of the MB, such as the long-
lasting effects of Nasser’s repression of the MB and Sadat’s religious and liberal politics. 
These factors influenced the decision making of the organization and the orientation of 
the Islamist movement, which again led to the Brothers’ moderate development. 
Consequently, there are more or less strong links between extrinsic and the intrinsic 
factors, which will be analyzed later.      
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In the 1970s, the leadership of the MB pursued two related objectives. One, the 
official state recognition of the Brotherhood as a party, will be discussed later in this 
chapter. The other was the revival and rebuilding of the movement, which had almost 
ceased to exist during under Nasser. The latter objective must be analyzed a bit deeper 
because the environmental circumstances facilitating the MB’s emergence during the 
Sadat era also decisively shaped the moderate orientation of the movement.65 
a. External Influences Based on Arab Nationalism and 
Secularization 
The literature offers many explanations for the revival of the MB. Some of 
these explanations refer to events that lead to the demise of Arab nationalism in the 
1960s. This caused a search for safe refuge in religious beliefs, which again pushed the 
popularity of Islamic and Islamist movements throughout Egypt. First, there was the 
Yemen War, also known as Nasser’s Vietnam. After a military putsch, a group of army 
officers seized power in the country of Yemen on the Arabian Peninsula in the early 
1960s. Soon they pronounced the establishment of a Yemini Republic, their dedication to 
Arab nationalism, and their support for Nasser’s goal of Arab unity. However, the 
revolution presented a threat to the stability of Yemen’s neighbor Saudi Arabia. 
Consequently, the Saudi king, Saud, conspired with the leaders of the overthrown regime 
to regain power. The coup’s leaders again requested Nasser’s support, and Egypt’s 
president responded with a massive troop deployment to the Arabian Peninsula. This was 
the beginning of a protracted proxy war, which lasted five years before the Egyptian 
armed forces eventually, unsuccessfully, withdrew from Yemen in December 1967. The 
effects on Egyptian morale and the economy were enormous and cost the country dearly. 
Nasser’s miscalculated military enterprise against the reactionary Yemini forces alienated 
many Egyptians from the idea of Arab nationalism, and disappointment in Egyptian 
politics increased.66 
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However, a second event that took place in June of 1967 gave Nasser’s 
ideology of Arab nationalism its quietus: the Six-Day War. This immense blow to the 
united Arab forces and the grievous loss of life, equipment, territory, and valuable state 
revenues presented a vast humiliation and economic disaster for Egypt’s messianic leader 
and his people. The defeat eliminated any possibility of Nasser’s pursuing his goal of 
Arab nationalism. Instead, his politics caused the realignment of Egyptian policy towards 
state nationalism and precipitated enormous domestic grievances. Economic problems, 
excessive national debt, migration from areas occupied by the Israelis, and wounded 
Egyptian pride caused tremendous problems and feelings of dislocation within Egypt. 
Like many Arabs, the people of Egypt had trusted his leadership and propaganda. They 
had believed in his success. Within six days, all their hopes were destroyed. Many of 
them found refuge in Islam. Others were influenced by the interpretation of Islamist 
movements. The defeat provided the Islamist opposition with ammunition. In the 
aftermath of the war, radical and moderate Islamist movements argued that the debacle 
was the consequence of the state’s secular orientation, which violated the principles of 
Islam. No matter what eventually influenced the Egyptian people, many gave up their 
belief in Nasser’s secular ideology and turned towards religious faith and Islamic as well 
as Islamist movements.67 
Some scholars present a third argument for the revival of the MB in Egypt, 
one unrelated to the demise of Arab nationalism. They consider the decade-long 
relationship between Saudi Arabia and the Islamist movement as a decisive factor in the 
emergence of the Brothers during the 1970s. On one hand, the MB considered the 
conservative social and political system embodied in the Saudi regime as a successful 
example of an Islamic state and, on the other hand, the Saudis provided shelter for 
members of the organization during its repression in Egypt. The Saudis opposed Nasser’s 
ideology of Arab nationalism, an ideology which led to the proxy war in Yemen, and the 
Saudis approved of an Islamic influence in Egypt in order to keep secular forces in check. 
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This presents a logical explanation for the Saudi support of the MB and also the interest 
in the financial backing of Sadat’s political enterprises after he took over office until the 
peace treaty with Israel.68  
Nevertheless, the external factors presented above were at best a sufficient 
condition for the revival and political orientation of the MB in the 1970s. Without doubt, 
the circumstances of Arab nationalism’s demise facilitated the popularity of Islam and 
Islamist organizations, and Saudi support also guaranteed the survival of the MB. 
However, none of these external factors presents a satisfying explanation for the political 
development of the MB during the Sadat era. The key to this development lies in the 
political changes that occurred with the succession of the presidency from Nasser to 
Sadat. 
b. Policy Shifts Under Sadat and the Repression Trauma 
After Sadat took office, his pursuit of legitimacy as the new head of state 
greatly influenced his young presidency. Even after his death, the prestige and appeal of 
Nasser, Sadat’s predecessor, outshone the young president. In military and government 
circles, but also in public opinion, Nasser’s former vice-president was considered a weak 
leader. The fact that Nasser’s reign had left deep marks in politics and society further 
facilitated this unfavorable perception. Nasserist and leftist influences were strong and 
well placed. These aspects challenged and threatened Sadat’s political base. While he was 
eventually able to eliminate Nasser’s old political guard, led by Sabri, by means of the 
corrective revolution, it was much more difficult to eradicate deep-rooted leftist 
movements. 
Regarding the latter, Sadat decisively benefitted from the religious 
sentiment within society after the demise of Nasser’s Arab nationalism. Combined with 
his religious and pious appearance, his further entrenchment of Islam in politics and 
public life, and his support of Islamic and Islamist movements, Sadat managed to move 
against the grassroots of his political opposition. The major beneficiaries of this 
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development were the MB and Islamist student movements at the universities. After the 
Brothers’ leadership sent a clear signal of their moderate attitude in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s to the Egyptian public and ruler, Sadat used the movement and the students 
for his political objectives, systematically building up a countermovement against the 
political left (socialists, Marxists, and Nasserists) and extreme right and its radical 
groups. Thus, Egypt’s new president managed to keep his opposition in check. For this 
reason, it was in Sadat’s interest to grant further acknowledgement and freedom to the 
organization in the course of his presidency. Gradually, he released and rehabilitated the 
members of the MB who were imprisoned or exiled and allowed the movement some 
political undertakings.69  
Nasser’s repression had left the MB weak and fragmented. The Islamist 
movement used the freedom and opportunities the new regime offered and re-emerged 
from the ashes to become powerful again. Although Sadat did not intend to legalize the 
technically still-illegal society, he tolerated its further lawful pursuit of political 
influence. Sadat’s liberal politics presented the chance the Brothers had been waiting for 
to develop and spread their political ideas and influence in Egypt. In 1976, the president 
allowed the movement to resume publication of its newspaper, al-Da’wa (The Call), 
which had been banned under the old regime since 1954. Restrictions were lifted on other 
aspects of public life as well. With such an opportunity at hand, the MB managed to 
reestablish its political base and entrench itself within Egyptian society. The growing 
parallel Islamic sector, along with its manifold organizations, proved to be fertile terrain. 
The MB intensified their recruitment at Egyptian universities to win members of the 
student unions to their cause. These practices were condoned by Sadat. As a result, over 
the years the movement regained popularity and, eventually, members.70 
In spite of the opportunities offered by Sadat’s new regime, the 
experiences of the decade-long repression under Nasser were a determining factor for the 
movement’s moderate path. Like his predecessor al-Hudaybi, who died in 1973, the new 
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General Guide of the organization, Umar al-Tilmisani, pursued a moderate path seeking 
to avoid any confrontation with the Egyptian state. The rethinking that is evident in the 
book Preachers, Not Judges was focused on avoiding the cost of violence—the cruel 
experience of repression—as well as salvaging the MB’s reputation in the eyes of the 
public and the state and rebuilding the organization. The persistent and savage 
prosecution of its members during Nasser’s presidency had stamped the Brothers and 
their leadership. Even if the new regime and its religious character seemed to be 
promising and in line with some of their ideas, they had learned to be cautious and 
observant with regards to any interaction with Egypt’s new ruler. Their moderate path 
was acknowledged by the regime and had opened a window of opportunity that they were 
no longer willing to risk losing. Instead, under al-Tilmisani, the MB intensified their 
efforts to achieve true legal recognition as a party and enter the political arena. 
Consequently, the achievement of goals by moderate political means became the central 
focus of the MB. In the long run, only this would guarantee its revival, its legal status as a 
party, and eventually its secure future in Egypt—which were its main objectives.71   
The combination of liberal policies under Sadat and the ever-present vivid 
memories of repression under Nasser strongly influenced the MB and supported a 
consolidation of its moderate development. Therefore, these two extrinsic factors 
describe the necessary condition for the Brotherhood’s political orientation. The demise 
of Arab nationalism and Saudi support also contributed to this orientation, but not to such 
a high degree. Neither can the importance of leadership in the movement’s decision 
making process and orientation in the 1970s be discounted. Obviously, there is a link 
between the MB response to external influences and MB leadership, as represented by 
Umar al-Tilmisani. For this very reason, his role will be analyzed in depth when dealing 
with intrinsic factors in the following paragraphs. 
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2. Intrinsic Factors 
With regard to the topic of this chapter, intrinsic motivation based on factors like 
leadership, ideological change, or generational shift may provide reasons for the 
development of the MB and its moderate consolidation during the Sadat era. The 
following paragraphs assess these aspects, which may also have been subject to the 
external influences described above. 
a. Leadership and Organizational Structure 
According to many scholars, the Brotherhood’s third General Guide, 
Umar al-Timisani, decisively shaped the moderate and political orientation of the 
Brethren under his leadership. Some authors mention his enormous ability to impose 
himself on the movement—a characteristic quality that his predecessor Hasan Isma’il al-
Hudaybi for the most part lacked. Due to this strength, combined with his enormous 
persuasiveness, he managed to mint the MB, convince potential followers, and fascinate 
his environment with his ideas. Thus, al-Tilmisani was regarded as the General Guide 
who brought the movement back to life after its darkest period during Nasser’s 
presidency.72  
Based on these character traits, the third murshid—like the founder of the 
MB, Hasan al-Banna—managed to become a central and dominant figure within the 
organization. Important decisions, especially those dealing with the political participation 
of the movement, were a matter of the Brotherhood’s leadership or al-Tilmisani himself. 
Even the political activity of single members of the movement was granted or denied by 
the General Guide.73 In short, during the Sadat era the formerly repressed, weak, and 
fragmented Brethren reassumed their pyramidal organizational structure with a strict top-
down approach combined with obedience to the new murshid’s guidance. This clear 
organizational structure did not leave much room for dissidents or compromises along the 
mainstream of the movement dictated by al-Tilmisani. 
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Al-Tilmisani was a member of the Guidance Council of the movement 
during al-Hudaybi’s leadership and belonged to the close moderate entourage supporting 
the second General Guide in writing Preachers, Not Judges. After taking the helm, he 
abided by the moderate path treaded by his predecessor. Like al-Hudaybi, he pursued the 
objectives of ensuring the MB’s continued existence and revival and the redemption of its 
reputation. In addition, al-Tilmisani intensified the efforts towards legal recognition as a 
political party. According to Mohammed Zahid and Hesham al-Awadi, the new General 
Guide envisioned a secure future for the MB that was based on a transition “from its 
traditional focus on spiritual piety to political activism.”74 Consequently, he redefined the 
movement’s orientation towards more political engagement, in order to achieve legal 
recognition. Along with the Brotherhood’s proven moderate path and their political 
engagement, al-Tilmisani also tried to fight for the MB’s legal recognition in court. In 
1977 he filed to overturn the dissolution of the Brothers’ by the People’s Court, which 
had happened under Nasser in December 1954, but he had to learn that despite the 
regime’s liberal political changes under Sadat, the judicial system remained under the 
regime’s influence and not achieved independence.75 
Another aspect of the importance of al-Tilmisani’s leadership was his 
close dialogue with Sadat on different occasions. The General Guide was not only able to 
build the ruler’s confidence in the movement’s practices but also widen the MB’s room to 
maneuver within society and increase its sphere of influence. In this context, a good 
example is the readmission and utilization of the Brothers’ newspaper al-Da’wa in 1976, 
and the president’s and Supreme Guide’s discussion about its content.76 Raymond W. 
Baker underlines al-Tilmisani’s influence in this context, based on the fact that the 
murshid was also the editor of the journal and, therefore, had a direct influence on 
published articles. Baker gets to the heart of al-Tilmisani’s role in the development of the 
organization and in dialogue with Sadat when he writes that the Supreme Guide 
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“personified the Muslim Brotherhood”77 and that for this reason his “strategic 
decisions…in the seventies for limited cooperation with the regime laid the intellectual 
and practical foundations for the legal expansions in the eighties into nearly all aspects of 
public life.”78 Finally, al-Tilmisani was a courteous man, respected by Egyptian officials. 
He had never been part of any violent group within the movement, such as the Special 
Apparatus, and was able to convince the regime as if he were a partner in the president’s 
dialogue with the Brotherhood.79 In other words, al-Tilmisani’s leadership was not only 
important in the Brotherhood’s interaction with the state during the Sadat era but in the 
policies and future of the whole organization.  
All these findings strongly emphasize the influence of the General Guide’s 
leadership on the development of the MB in the 1970s. Al-Tilmisani revived the 
organizational structure based on his strong, central, single leadership, which the MB had 
last displayed under its charismatic founder, Hasan al-Banna, and lost under its second 
Supreme Guide Hasan Isma’il al-Hudaybi. As a result, the murshid’s guidance 
dominantly shaped the movement and its objectives. However, beyond his strong 
influence, Umar al-Tilmisani’s moderate and political course for the MB provoked 
different reactions among not only the Brothers but also potential followers. Because 
these reactions can be partially linked to generational differences, the side effects of al-
Tilmisani’s leadership—which in turn influenced the MB—will be discussed separately 
in the following section. 
b. Internal and Radical Trends Based on Generational Issues 
Al-Tilmisani’s pursuit of moderation and political activism provoked a 
variety of opinions not only within the organization, but also with regard to Islamist 
trends outside the MB. Internally, the murshid and his followers formed a group that 
Gilles Kepel called the “neo-Muslim Brethren.” In accordance with al-Tilmisani’s ideas, 
they sought ties with the People’s Assembly during the Sadat era, cooperated with the 
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regime, and used connections in business, religious, and political circles to increase their 
influence in furtherance of their political objectives. After it was republished in 1976, the 
magazine al-Da’wa was the reformists’ mouthpiece and presented its position on all 
questions of life to the Egyptian public. Besides religious and political themes, it covered 
also social and economic contents.80 
Al-Tilmisani’s and neo-Muslim Brethren’s ideas about the MB’s modern 
appearance in Egyptian society were opposed by an old guard of members who had been 
strongly influenced by Nasser’s repression. This generation of the MB was represented 
by senior members like Muhammad Mahdi Akif, who suffered for decades in Nasser’s 
prisons. These MB members were “generally more zealous, conservative, and committed 
primarily to long-term religious missionary work … and to preserving the movement’s 
unity.”81 They shared al-Banna’s point of view with regard to party politics and did not 
support the MB’s opportunity to engage in the Egyptian political arena as a party. 
Corruption, conflict, rivalry, and national divisiveness were the negative characteristics 
the Brethren’s first Supreme Guide had identified during his years at the helm. Al-Banna 
envisioned the MB in the role of a religious consultant in political matters to each regime. 
By this means, the movement remained outside the political cesspool, continuously 
reformed all parts of society in accordance with its ideals, and played the part of a moral 
custodian. Furthermore, the old guard’s relationship to other political or social groups, or 
even former rivals, was characterized either by constant suspicion or by insurmountable 
differences due to past confrontation.82  
For the sake of an MB future that he envisioned in terms of further 
political engagement in party politics, al-Tilmisani was willing to meet the convictions of 
the old guard. Unconcerned about their apprehension of a decline in the MB’s role in 
spiritual guidance, he pursued its transformation from traditional piety to political 
activism and challenged the conservative members. The murshid even welcomed the 
                                                 
80 Kepel, Muslim Extremism, 103, 106–107, 249. 
81 Israel E. Altman, “Democracy, Elections and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood,” Vol. 3 of Current 
Trends in Islamist Ideology, ed. Hillel Fradkin et al. (Washington, D.C.: Hudson Istitute Inc., 2006): 26. 
82 Ibid., 26. Mitchell, Muslim Brothers, 218–220, Ch. X. David Commins, “Hasan al-Banna (1906–
1949),” in Pioneers of Islamic Revival, ed. Ali Rahnema (New York: Zed Books, 2006), 136. 
 49
internal discussion during his ambitious striving for transition, and despite the differences 
in the basic ideological attitude of neo-Muslim Brethren and old guard, al-Tilmisani 
managed to keep the movement united.83 
However, as a consequence of Sadat’s gradual grant of amnesty to the 
movement’s members, some radical figures of the MB’s military wing, the Special 
Apparatus (nizam al-khass), arrived again on the scene. This violent branch of the 
organization was still held in high esteem by members of the old guard, such as Akif, 
who considered it something glorious, to be proud of. Al-Hudaybi had met especially 
strong resistance and caused internal schism when he tried to secure his position by 
removing his opponents and the organization’s military wing after he took office. In the 
following times, the Secret Apparatus started to perform independent actions against the 
government. After they planned and pursued the attempt to assassinate Nasser in 1954, its 
failure started the president’s harsh crackdown on the MB. This weakened and 
fractionalized the Secret Apparatus and its followers lost their influence for decades, as 
did the whole remaining movement.84 
After the members of nizam al-khass were released from prison, they 
resumed work within the MB and managed to enter some posts in the Guidance Office 
with the objective of assuming control of the organization. This group of prison-
experienced hardliners intended to rebuild the movement and, once again, challenge the 
state by recruiting like-minded members to lead the MB to new strength. Already during 
their final years in prison, Sadat’s liberal policy and intention to use the Islamists against 
his political opposition had facilitated contacts with student movements on which these 
toughened and determined old members decided to build after they were rehabilitated.85  
Egypt’s largest Islamist student organization, the jama’at al-islamiyya, 
was at the center of the nizam al-khass’ attention. The students benefitted from Sadat’s 
political objectives and had gained enormous power on university campuses. Over the 
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years, they managed to successfully increase their influence on campus by providing 
important services to their fellow students. Identifying ordinary problems and providing 
solutions was their biggest strength. For instance, these young Islamists organized cheap 
study materials, accommodation, and suitable transport for female students. Furthermore, 
they fought for improvements in the studying conditions on campuses, like the packed 
lecture halls and organized summer camps that became important social venues. They 
soon won followers and achieved a landmark success during the student elections against 
the grassroots of the regime’s opposition in 1976.86  
Although these young Islamists were not affiliated with any particular 
political movement outside their universities, they were influenced by the ideas of 
Islamic scholars like Mohammed al-Ghazali and Yusuf al-Qaradawi and also by the more 
radical teachings of Sayyid Qutb. In general, many students felt a certain affinity to rigid 
and traditional Islamist approaches, as well as to a more militant stance. Most of the 
student leaders of jama’at al-islamiyya were honored and attracted by the recruiting 
advances of the MB hardliners, whom they saw as legends. Finally, the nizam al-khass 
convinced some of the most influential students to join the ranks of the MB. 
Nevertheless, both sides drew a veil of silence over this alliance. They had their reasons 
for this solution. The Brotherhood expected further recruitment under the students’ 
banner to be more successful for their cause, while the students feared a loss of their 
supporters if the alliance should come to light. This precaution was based on the 
moderate path of the MB’s General Guide, al-Tilmisani, who was rejected by radical 
elements of the student organization.87 
Despite the care taken, the merger leaked out in the late 1970s and the 
militant elements broke with the jama’at al-islamiyya. The radicals either joined forces in 
the students’s fundamentalist successor organization, jama’a al-islamiyya, or in the 
militant tanzim al-jihad, in order to use violence against the Egyptian regime to pursue 
their objectives. However, students that had become members of the MB were subject to 
al-Tilmisani’s influence and became convinced by his arguments of a moderate political 
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path. Additionally, in 1981 Sadat’s assassination led to a major prosecution of radical 
Islamist elements throughout Egypt. The fact that some leading figures of the nizam al-
khass were also affected by this clampdown turned out to be to the murshid’s advantage. 
It gave him the unrestricted opportunity to pursue his political ideas for the MB.88 
Like the reactions of the more radical trends within the student movement 
of the 1970s, other radical Islamist groupings either avoided any contact with the MB or 
broke away and pursued violence to oppose the regime and achieve their objectives. Two 
of them shall be mentioned. The Society of Muslims (jama’at al-muslimin) was founded 
by the agricultural engineer Shukri Ahmad Mustafa, who was strongly influenced by his 
prison experiences and Qutb’s ideas. The members of this radical organization were 
convinced that the Egyptian state and society were misguided and suffered from 
jahiliyyah (ignorance of divine guidance). In order to establish their vision of an Islamic 
society, they avoided negative jahili influences by living in isolation, gained strength by 
preaching its ideas, and eventually planned to return and fight the jahili state and society. 
Convinced by their ideological beliefs, the jama’at al-muslimin strongly opposed the 
moderate path of the MB introduced by al-Hudaybi. Their leader, Mustafa, had nothing 
but contempt for the reformist orientation of the neo-Muslim Brethren and considered it a 
weakness that would lead to their doom. Therefore, he distanced himself from the MB, 
which in his eyes was no true and legitimate Islamic movement. The Society of Muslims 
entered their violent phase in the second half of the 1970s.89 
Another radical grouping of the Sadat era was the Islamic Liberation Party 
(ILP, hizb al-tahrir al-islami), which was established by Salih Siriyya, a Palestinian. 
After Siriyya had moved to Cairo in the early 1970s, he frequented the MB and 
befriended Zaynab al-Ghazali, head of the Muslim Sisters and a leading Islamist feminist 
figure, and the MB Supreme Guide al-Hudaybi. The Palestinian was also influenced by 
Qutb’s ideas but did not agree with Qutb’s opinion of jahili society. Siriyya regarded the 
regime as the massive obstacle preventing the re-Islamization of the state. Furthermore, 
he was unable to align with the gradualist convictions of the MB to achieve an Islamic 
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state. Therefore, he assembled a group of young people, primarily students, and formed 
the ILP in order to focus on an immediate transformation of the state. In 1974, the ILP 
became the first group to attack Sadat’s liberal politics and staged a violent but 
unsuccessful coup d’état.90 
These examples show that the radicals, no matter whether initially close or 
more distanced from the moderate Brothers, decided to pursue their own objectives. This 
observation underlines the clear signal that the MB sent to the Egyptian Islamist 
movement. Additionally, the radical actions were condemned by the leadership of the 
MB at the time. For them, there was no moral justification for the radicals’ use of 
violence. The Brothers’ statements drove the wedge even deeper between the radical 
groupings and the MB. 
To sum up this section, therefore, it can be said that different internal and 
more external, but still close, generational influences existed that opposed the reformist 
development of the MB. However, the ideological orientation of the Brothers that was 
introduced by al-Hudaybi and defended and developed by his strong successor al-
Tilmisani prevailed against those influences. Furthermore, it was al-Tilmisani who played 
a key role. He was powerful and convincing and, thereby, capable to successfully meet 
or, with regards to the old guard, control dissidents. As a result, leadership had a strong 
impact on generational influences and needs to be linked to the defense of the Brothers’ 
moderate path against internal or radical generational trends. Moreover, the ideological 
aspects, which will be presented in the following section, obviously presented a hurdle 
that prevented a rapprochement of radical elements. 
c. Ideological Considerations 
During the Sadat era the different Islamist movements had one thing in 
common, the objective of establishing an Islamic state. However, they strongly disagreed 
on how to achieve this common goal. This disagreement between the Islamist movements 
originated from two writings, al-Hudaybi’s Preachers, not Judges and Qutb’s Milestones. 
These books emerged as a result of an unbridgeable ideological gap between the radical 
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and moderate camps within the MB and described two different means—teaching vs. 
violence—to the same end, an Islamic state. These different ideological perspectives not 
only were an important factor in the split of the MB, but also influenced the generations 
of Islamists that were still to come. 
In the 1970s, the MB abided by its moderate path. The reformists had 
learned from the experiences of the past that moderation presented the only possibility to 
secure the organization’s future by regaining strength and whitewashing its reputation 
while legally pursuing its objective. However, over the years, the MB’s new murshid al-
Tilmisani opted for further development of the movement’s traditional engagement in 
society, which was solely based on teaching and preaching. He attached more importance 
to future political engagement of the Brethren and pushed for a transition from spiritual 
piety to political activism. As already described above, al-Tilmisani managed to prevail 
against the traditional views of the old guard, who shared al-Banna’s opinion on the 
negative effects of party politics, and minted the organization according to his ideas. At 
the same time, the engagement in politics and eventually the acknowledgement as a 
political party would present further legitimacy, influence, and support for the 
movement’s cause. Although al-Tilmisani’s ideological advancements and lawsuits that 
abandoned some of al-Banna’s traditional views never earned the MB recognition as a 
political party, he at least managed to stress the importance of moderate political activity 
and facilitated access to the political arena for following generations of Brethren. 
Furthermore, this strict abidance to the MB’s moderate path, which was 
defined by the denial of violence in achieving an Islamic state, kept radical elements from 
joining the MB and their influences at arm’s length. This again allowed for a 
consolidation of the moderate orientation of the organization. But, as discussed, the 
ideological development was strongly linked to al-Tilmisani’s leadership and was 
supported by the MB’s organizational structure, which followed a strict top-down 
approach combined with obedience to the murshid.  
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3. Islamist Auto-Reform 
As described earlier, for decades the MB tried to achieve their goals by openly 
confronting the Egyptian authoritarian regime under Nasser. Besides political 
engagement, planning and conducting violent actions like armed uprisings and 
assassinations were employed as conventional means towards their objectives. Especially 
after the assassination attempt on Nasser, the responses of the state can be characterized 
as acts of overwhelming repression against the MB whenever the movement stepped over 
one of the thin red lines of the regime. The interaction between both sides had a long 
lasting impact on the Islamists, which influenced its objectives under Sadat, as this 
chapter has revealed. 
Carry Rosefsky Wickham identifies learning, or the process of learning, as one of 
the main components of her theoretical approach. In this context, the Brethren’s 
interaction with the regime during the Nasser period should be considered a learning 
process that caused, first and foremost, a rethinking to abide violence. However, the long 
lasting impressions primarily took effect in the Sadat era by further influencing the MB’s 
decision making and thereby shaping the organization. Based on the perception that 
decades of futile attempts to confront the regime had lead to no success but only 
worsened the conditions for the MB, the leadership eventually opted for cooperation with 
the regime under the new president. Furthermore, the MB under al-Tilmisani focused on 
political activism to preserve the movement from harm by increasing its legitimacy. 
Thus, in the first instance they learned that violence was a bad option in pursuing their 
objectives and they reoriented themselves on another less harmful path, political 
activism, to move on. Moreover, their rethinking was approved by the regime, which 
eventually was an acknowledgement to continue—in short a learning success. 
Although, the MB’s moderate path during the Sadat era was clearly dominated by 
al-Tilmisani’s leadership, it becomes obvious that a learning experience also planted the 
seeds for the political activism of the MB. Thereby, for the most part, Wickham’s thesis 
can be affirmed for this period. However, until Sadat’s assassination, those seeds did not 
come up enough to spark the political engagement that again forms the premises for 
Wickham’s idea of Islamist auto-reform. Therefore, Islamist auto-reform does not present 
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in its entirety an explanation as an influential factor for the consolidation of the Brothers’ 
moderate path during the 1970s, though it does play a decisive part. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The findings of this chapter, which are based on the analysis of extrinsic and 
intrinsic factors, elucidate that during the Sadat era the development and orientation of 
the MB was strongly influenced by the Brothers’ new Supreme Guide Umar al-Tilmisani. 
The impact of his leadership was far reaching and was shaped by his vision of abiding by 
a moderate path while pursuing legitimacy and political activism to secure the 
organization’s future. Al-Tilmisani left no room for the influences of other trends, 
opinions, or ideologies. He managed to revive the MB, hold the movement together by 
preventing factionalism, and push the Brothers in the direction he envisioned. Finally, al-
Tilmisani remembered and benefitted from the organization’s hierarchical, organizational 
structure, characterized by a clear, top-down approach, which enormously bolstered his 
influence.   
However, the success of the Supreme Guide’s realignment of the MB towards 
political activism was primarily facilitated by the presidential shift from Nasser to Sadat. 
This presented a fruitful ground for the MB and supported their aspiration for a new 
beginning. Other external factors had an impact on the new beginning of the Brethren, 
but played a secondary role. At the same time, the experiences of Nasser’s harsh 
repression were still present. This also shaped the organization and convinced its 
leadership that violence was the wrong and unfruitful means to achieve the movement’s 
main objective, an Islamic state. Furthermore, it taught them to be cautious about the 
state’s leaders, despite the regime’s liberal sectarian politics. As a consequence, the 
pursuit of legitimacy became an important intermediate goal. Recognition as a party, 
which was thought to protect the Brothers against state sanctions in the future, was 
especially vital for the new General Guide and fostered al-Tilmisani’s decision to shift 
from the MB’s path of traditional piety to political activism.  
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In part, Islamist auto-reform, as understood by Carry Rosefsky Wickham, should 
also be considered as an important factor in the MB’s retention of its moderate 
orientation during Sadat’s presidency. The findings of this chapter clearly show that the 
Brotherhood’s environmental framework provoked a learning process, which led to the 
leadership’s intensive strategic focus on political activism. Besides the merger of the 
students with the ranks of the Brethren, this planted the seeds for an influential and 
successful new generation of political activists within the organization, which had an 
important impact in the 1980s. 
To sum up, this chapter has shown the importance of the effects of the 
organization’s leadership in the consolidation of the MB’s moderate path during the 
Sadat era. The Supreme Guide’s influence and clear stance as well as past experiences 
with the ancient regime were major factors in abiding by the late al-Hudaybi’s decision to 
deny violence in order to achieve the organization’s objectives. However, policy shifts 
under Sadat granted the MB the freedom to pursue their objective with almost no 
restrictions and have to be considered an important facilitator. 
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IV. POLITICAL STAGNATION IN THE MUBARAK ERA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
When Egyptian President Anwar Sadat fell victim to assassination by Islamist 
radicals in 1981 his deputy, Hosni Mubarak, succeeded as Egyptian president. In 
February 2011, after being in office for almost thirty years, he bowed to the rising 
revolutionary public pressure, based on increasing dissatisfaction with his authoritarian 
politics, and resigned as the country’s leader. Mubarak’s resignation marked the end of a 
turbulent period for the Muslim Brotherhood.  Under the lead of a strong Supreme Guide, 
Umar al-Tilmisani, and Mubarak’s accommodating regime politics, the Brethren were 
able to follow a moderate path of continuous political activism as well as religious and 
social engagement. As a result, the Muslim Brotherhood managed to considerably 
increase their influence in all levels of the Egyptian political arena and society and 
developed into a strong political opposition force with deep grassroots in the networks of 
an emerging parallel Islamic sector.  
During the 1990s, conditions changed, and over the following years different 
external environmental, but also internal organizational, factors pushed the moderate 
development of the Muslim Brotherhood into a choppy rollercoaster ride characterized by 
several drastic ups and downs. Finally, beginning by the end of the last decade, the 
moderation process seems to reach an impasse. Despite the movement’s political success 
in the parliamentary elections of 2005, based on the progressing internalization of 
modern democratic political concepts and values, and the latter’s merger with Islamic 
beliefs, the moderate path stagnated. Especially, changes to the political agenda and the 
apparent return of a conservative mindset in public support this opinion. Due to the 
pioneering role that Egypt plays in the Middle East with regard to political, ideological, 
and cultural influences, and the standing of the Muslim Brotherhood as one of the most 
influential Islamist organizations of the region, this development is alarming and may 
have negative consequences outside Egypt. Therefore, this chapter focuses on the MB’s 
moderate development, its setbacks, and stagnation over the past thirty years of 
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Mubarak’s presidency and seeks an answer to the question: Why—despite continued 
moderation and political successes—did the Muslim Brotherhood’s development stagnate 
during the Mubarak era? 
Many scholars and analysts of the Middle East and Egypt have written about this 
eventful period in the history of the Muslim Brotherhood. They offer valuable 
information and data regarding the development of the organization. This chapter will 
build on these authors’ studies and analyses and utilize their findings as references to 
provide a comprehensive and critical evaluation of the full range of factors that had an 
impact on the Brethren’s political endeavors, their moderate path, and, finally, the 
obvious stagnation of this positive development. Furthermore, after analyzing the 
different influential extrinsic and intrinsic factors based on the approach, following 
organizational theory, the remaining theories presented in the introduction of this thesis 
will be applied. This chapter will show that the Muslim Brotherhood’s continued 
moderate development and the stagnation of this process were caused by a bandwidth of 
interacting factors and cannot be reduced to a single explanation. Especially leadership, 
generational and organizational structure, and regime and U.S. policies, but also a 
continued learning process of the movement based on the political environment 
facilitated further moderation, while some of these factors also contributed to a stagnation 
of the political progress in this era.  
After a historical review of the analyzed period, the following sections will 
describe the influence of external factors, followed by a detailed consideration of internal 
aspects like generational and organizational structure, leadership issues, and ideological 
influences. The application of these different theories will complete the analysis. 
B. HISTORICAL REVIEW 
After the assassination of Anwar Sadat in 1981, his successor, Hosni Mubarak, 
had to face the consequences of Sadat’s politics on the international and domestic stages. 
Especially, Sadat’s major political achievement, the peace treaty with Israel, caused four 
major side effects Mubarak repeatedly had to deal with during his time in office. First, by 
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concluding the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, Sadat had ignored the “Three No’s”91 
based on an agreement of the Arab world during the Khartoum Summit Conference in 
1967. His decision was regarded as a betrayal of common Arab objectives and opposition 
to Israel. This led to Egypt’s expulsion from the Arab League and the termination of 
existing political and economic relations between the members of the league and Egypt.92 
Second, the treaty and its direct consequences turned into a political disaster with 
regard to Egyptian public opinion and fueled the rise of radical revolutionary Islamist 
movements in the country, which eventually, led to Sadat’s assassination by radical 
Egyptian Islamists. Moreover, this facilitated the emergence of transnational jihadi 
organizations like al-Qaeda—a serious problem that Egypt, as a Western ally and close to 
the United States, repeatedly had to deal with in the following decades of Mubarak’s 
presidency.93  
Third, economic problems and the expulsion from the Arab League forced Egypt 
into an even deeper relationship with the West and affected the search for a new role 
within the Arab world. For ages the North African country had held the Arabs’ cultural 
and political leadership role and was considered an inspiring example, based on its rich 
history and identity. Now this proud nation had to seek a new place, which it found and 
consolidated by its sometimes-questionable and chameleonic position as a peace 
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negotiator or mediator between Israel, the West, and Arabs. The new president also tried 
to assume the position of a Palestinian patron for all questions regarding a solution of the 
conflict between Israelis and Palestinians.94 
Last, after Egypt was banned by the other Arab states, it left a serious gap, a 
power vacuum, in the Arab world. No other Arab state had Egypt’s military power or was 
capable of steeping into Egypt’s place, although some—like Libya and Syria—tried to in 
the 1980s. However, in the 1990s, Iraq under Saddam Hussein successfully sought for 
power in the Middle East. Similar to those of Nasser, Hussein’s policies managed to win 
the hearts of the Arab people by his offensive and radical stance against Israel and the 
West, which destabilized the region and drove a wedge between the Arab leaders and 
their people. This ended after the invasion of Iraq in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. 
Nevertheless, this cleared the way for another powerful state, Iran, to emerge in the 
region and oppose Western influence and U.S.-friendly Arab regimes in the beginning of 
the century.95 
In particular, the interaction of all these outcomes, based on Sadat’s peace treaty 
with Israel, determined Mubarak’s foreign and domestic politics during his presidency. In 
order to deal with the country’s very weak economy, Mubarak continued the economic 
opening introduced by Sadat’s al-infitah program, abided by peace with Israel and pro-
Western, pro-U.S. politics. He ensured important Western financial support thereby, but 
also granted further Western political and cultural influence. However, Egypt’s economic 
problems, Israel’s actions in Palestine, the Golan Heights, and Lebanon, and U.S. 
involvement in the region led to a divide between regime politics and Egyptian popular 
opinion over the years. Despite the fact that he opted for a “cold peace” with Israel and 
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achieved rapprochements with other Arab states during his time in office, this neither 
improved the domestic situation nor prevented the actions of radical Islamist movements 
opposing his politics.96 
After a period of indiscriminate repression against the Egyptian Islamist 
movements following Sadat’s assassination, Mubarak decided to accommodate and 
cooperate with the moderate MB. By using the MB’s broad societal access, combined 
with further democratic development and focused prosecution of radical tendencies, he 
intended to convince the population of the advantages of his policies and the radical 
Islamists of the need to deny violence. But alarmed by the MB’s political success, the 
Islamist electoral success in Algeria, and growing and far reaching Islamist influence in 
Egypt, Mubarak shifted once more towards suppression of the moderate Islamists in the 
early 1990s.97 
During the 1990s and 2000s, the regime adopted more and more authoritarian 
characteristics in domestic politics and slowed down the political ambitions of the MB by 
repeated arrests and legislative amendments. Nevertheless, in the 1980s a young 
generation of the MB that had emerged from the student movement of the 1970s pursued 
a successful political path. Their policy was primarily characterized by the increasing 
importance of contemporary political experience, as well as by democratic values. 
However, in 1995 a failed assassination attempt against Mubarak resulted (among other 
reasons) in a drastic crackdown on all Islamist organizations, including the Muslim 
Brothers. As a result, the movement was pushed into a depression caused by internal 
generational quarreling, which lasted until the early 2000s.98  
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Supported by a U.S. Middle Eastern policy that increased pressure on Mubarak to 
facilitate further democratization in Egypt, the MB achieved a tremendous success in the 
elections of 2005. However, Mubarak’s response of constitutional changes was a setback 
and left little hope for a similar success in future elections under his presidency. 
Additionally, internal disagreement within the MB with regard to the movement’s future 
ideological and political orientation resulted in a stagnation of the moderate path along 
modern and democratic values.99 
C. INFLUENCES ON THE BROTHERHOOD’S MODERATE 
DEVELOPMENT 
This analysis will focus on important extrinsic and intrinsic factors derived from 
organizational theory. However, this chapter’s screening of the organization’s 
development for influences will also deliver solid evidence for theoretical approaches, 
such as Islamist auto-reform and pothole, median voter, and Michels’s theory, as 
discussed in the introduction. It is possible to further support the argument of continued 
strong, moderate development of the movement during Mubarak’s presidency and a 
further abandoning of radical ideas. Nevertheless, the analysis will also show that the 
MB’s political path reached in some way a dead-end road by the end of the first decade 
of the century. This will complete the answer to the given research question of this 
chapter. 
1. Organizational Theory 
a. Extrinsic Factors 
The review of external factors will once more focus on the MB’s political 
environment in Egypt and the central role of the authoritarian state, as well as on 
President Mubarak. Other political influences, such as U.S. regional policies, also had an 
impact on the Brother’s political path and need to be considered separately.  
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(1) Regime Politics.  Mubarak, Enabler and Oppressor. Despite the 
deadly setback Sadat had experienced with his economic openness and political 
liberalization, Hosni Mubarak continued to abide by his predecessor’s policies when he 
took office. Furthermore, albeit in smaller steps, he sought to follow a path towards 
further democratization, enabling regular elections with multiple parties and an increase 
of press freedom. Nevertheless, Mubarak perceived political Islam in its different forms 
as a threat to his regime that could only be met by using the MB and their influence as a 
mass movement. Thereby, the Brotherhood was less a means to directly oppose the 
regime’s enemies than to convince the grassroots of the benefits of the regime’s socio-
economic policies, as well as to convince potential radicals of the need to reject violence. 
For this very reason, Mubarak opted for confidence-building with the MB, whose 
moderate development was well recognized by the new president. As a result, similar to 
his predecessors, the new president utilized the MB as a tool to pursue his own domestic 
political objectives.100 
However, Mubarak had learned from the past and the mistakes of 
former presidents; he refused to end the state of emergency, which granted him a 
powerful position from which to meet political enemies. He pursued a two-sided strategy 
to deal with the Islamist movement in the country. While the radicals remained under the 
pressure of his security apparatus, he kept a close eye on the Muslim Brotherhood by 
setting limits to their political freedom. For instance, Mubarak denied the organization’s 
wish to create a political party, although he allowed their electoral activity in professional 
unions, syndicates, and even parliament as independent candidates. He intended thereby 
to prevent the MB from emerging as a powerful opposition force to his own party, the 
National Democratic Party. The latter secured his legitimacy as Egypt’s ruler by 
dominating the parliament. The formal political inclusion of an organization like 
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the MB, which was independent from his control and had strong social links and popular 
support from wide parts of Egypt’s society, would have definitively threatened his 
presidency.101  
With this new concept in mind, Mubarak began his term in office. 
He released detainees of different parties and political organizations and granted them 
freedom to return to their professions and political activities. Among the political inmates 
released was the leadership of the Muslim Brothers, which had been arrested in the state 
prosecution that followed Sadat’s assassination. These Brethren pretty much resumed 
their political work where they had left off.  In the 1980s, the political activism based on 
the leadership and vision of Umar al-Tilmisani, as well as a generational shift within the 
movement, had increased and the open opposition of the MB against radical Islamism 
continued. MB members had finally discovered politics as the new means to achieve their 
goals and penetrated different political levels within the state, for example, student 
unions, professional association and even political parties seeking for power and 
influence.102 
As a consequence, the MB became more powerful in the 1980s. 
The Brotherhood used its opportunities and avoided direct confrontation with the state. 
However, despite the tacit agreement of mutual accommodation between the regime and 
the MB, the organization crossed the boundaries dictated by the Egyptian ruler. In the 
early 1990s, the Muslim Brotherhood criticized the state’s electoral law, its Iraqi policy 
(when Egypt joined the multinational coalition against Hussein’s attack of Kuwait), and 
finally brought shame to the regime by providing better care and support during the 1992 
earthquake than the government.103  
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In fact, 1992 has to be considered the turning point in the 
relationship between the regime and the MB. Mubarak—who had initially opted for a 
more liberal way of interaction—perceived their political development as a risk to the 
power of his regime. Alarmed by the MB’s political moves and success, its growing 
support by the Egyptians, its very capable and excellent social and financial network,104 
the results of the Algerian elections in 1992,105 and, finally, the ostensible meetings 
between U.S. representatives and the Muslim Brotherhood, Mubarak decided to shift 
towards repression. The situation got even worse after an assassination attempt against 
Mubarak in 1995 failed and the MB was accused of links to radical Islamist groups. This 
resulted in a drastic response by the regime, a crackdown on all Islamist organizations 
including the Muslim Brothers.106 
Over the following years, Mubarak and his regime adopted more 
and more authoritarianism in domestic politics, while democratic development stalled or 
even declined. With regard to this rather negative trend, the application of emergency law 
and its consequences for Egyptian society and the political environment was a decisive 
factor. After Sadat’s murder, Mubarak had declared a state of emergency to restore order 
in Egypt. Until the end of his presidency, Mubarak enforced the emergency law, which 
turned into an important means against his opponents and assured the persistence of his 
rule. He periodically asked parliament for an extension of the usually timely limited state 
of emergency, which was always granted due to the dominance of his party, to meet the 
threats from violence and terrorism. This was partly justified by the terrorist attacks in the 
1980s and 1990s. Later, the ground for emergency rule was less narrowly defined and 
aimed at the deterrence and guard of radical or criminal forces trying to incite unrest in 
Egypt. Thereby, the emergency law could be easily misused as a tool for political goals 
rather than for the establishment of security in the North African country.107     
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When Mubarak started to consider the MB a political threat, he 
shifted his policy from some sort of cooperation and accommodation to repression and 
containment in the early 1990s. According to regime argumentation, this policy shift was 
justified for different reasons: first, the claim that the MB was involved in a large and 
violent conspiracy against the state; second, the regime had been misguided in its efforts 
to engage the moderate Islamists, due to the latter’s confrontational course against the 
state; third, the MB only pretended to embrace a moderate path as a clever tactical 
maneuver to gain power; fourth, Islamists never change, and remain hostile as long as 
they are not controlled by the state; fifth and last, there are no shades of grey regarding 
Islamist movements, they are all the same. Due to these arguments and the changed 
grounds of the emergency law, all Islamist organizations took the centre stage of the 
state’s extensive prosecution. At the same time, the MB itself became a major rationale 
for the continuity of the state of emergency. In this way, Mubarak’s clever move pushed 
the MB into a vicious circle and yearlong suppression by the state’s coercive security 
apparatus. As a result, the organization, for instance, had to endure the massive 
crackdown that was already mentioned above, repeated arrests of leading Brethren, 
especially just before elections, and massive intimidation of its members, voters, or 
sympathizers. The MB was still illegal, which enabled Mubarak to deal with its 
opposition at will. This again had serious effects on simmering internal organizational 
problems, which will be discussed later in this chapter.108    
Despite repression and the hard setback of the crackdown in 1995, 
which caused severe internal factionalism in view of the MB’s political positions and 
engagement, the Brethren managed to overcome the obstacles and continued to focus on 
the pursuit of their ideas by political engagement. In order to meet this Islamist challenge 
on the political stage and restrict the MB, the regime additionally began to introduce legal 
and constitutional changes. The examples are manifold, such as the changes of the 
election laws for the professional syndicates—a stronghold of the Brotherhood’s political 
work in the 1980s and 1990s—which reduced their overwhelming electoral success 
tremendously. Other restrictions focused on the basis of the MB. For instance, Mubarak 
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spread a web of laws and regulations over the social and religious grassroots of the 
organization, which Wickham calls the parallel Islamic sector, and, thus both reduced the 
MB sphere of influence and increased the regime’s. Finally, constitutional changes like 
those after the MB’s electoral successes in the 2005s, which excluded independent 
candidates from elections and banned on religiously motivated parties and programs, 
strongly hampered future political engagement.109  
Besides the above-mentioned influences, Mubarak used the media 
for his objectives. Like many authoritarian rulers, he controlled the media. The regime 
owned or granted access to the market, or was able to assert strong influence over 
newspapers, radio, and TV. Accordingly, the authoritarian state determined press 
releases. At the same time, the independent media and journalists were under surveillance 
by the state, which used its huge security apparatus to ensure regime-friendly press. 
Besides structural limitations, legal constraints, censorship, and governmental influence 
through emergency law, editors and journalists suffered from repressive measures if they 
violated the rules. Threats, beatings, imprisonment, abduction, and even assassination 
were possible consequences of misbehavior. In this way, it was guaranteed that the media 
became an instrument of the authoritarian government, shaped public opinion in a 
regime-favorable way, and complied with the regime’s political goals. As a result, efforts 
of the MB to establish their own newspaper and distribute or air positive and supportive 
press were very limited. Furthermore, the government’s press releases helped to draw a 
negative and threatening picture in the minds of the Egyptian people about the Islamist 
movement and its political goals.110  
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Although Mubarak tried to cooperate with the Muslim 
Brotherhood while limiting its freedom at the same time, his strategy was not successful. 
He underestimated the Brothers’ influence and their development into a political party 
playing the political game, albeit illegally. Furthermore, he overestimated his 
government’s capability of pulling the strings within the relationship. The revival of 
Islamic radicalism in the 1990s sent the Egyptian state into a phase of indiscriminate 
repression of Islamist groups. Although the MB itself did not turn violent, for Mubarak 
this was a perfect opportunity to repel the Brothers who had become strong opponents 
and had clearly crossed the boundaries of the framework set by the regime. Although the 
Brotherhood experienced repeated repression and restrictions by the authoritarian regime, 
it managed to recover and abide by its moderate political activism. However, the legal 
steps changing the Egyptian electoral system eventually posed a massive insurmountable 
obstacle for the Brothers’ future political success and pursuit of change by means of the 
political game until the end of Mubarak’s rule. 
(2) External Political, Cultural and Social Influences. Besides the 
regime’s influences on the MB’s political path and development, there were other direct 
and indirect external factors that had an impact on the Islamist movement. Two important 
ones will be discussed in this section. First, the consequences of U.S. relationship with 
the Egyptian regime, as well as U.S. policy in the Middle East, need to be considered 
before the relationship between Egyptian society and the MB is analyzed. 
The relatively close relationship between Egypt and the U.S. dates 
back to Anwar Sadat. In the early 1970s, he intended to improve Egypt’s economic and 
financial problems, which mainly were a result of the ongoing conflict with Israel and the 
loss of major sources of revenue during the war in 1967. Knowing the strong American 
influence on Israel’s leadership, he pursued realignment of relations with the cold war 
parties and a shift from the Soviet Union towards the U.S. as the only solution to 
improving Egypt’s situation. But as a defeated party of the Six-Day War, Egypt was in a 
weak position for negotiations. Even U.S. mediation early in 1973 could do nothing to 
iron out this crucial problem and improve Egypt’s bargaining position. The Yom Kippur 
War led Egypt out of this gridlock to where it was accepted as an equal partner for peace 
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negotiations. In addition, Sadat secured financial aid to improve Egypt’s economy from 
the U.S. who—due to the use of the oil weapon111—was eventually forced to end the 
crisis and broker a deal between Israelis and Arabs. However, these political moves and 
the following introduction of al-infitah did not improve Egypt’s economic situation and 
forced Sadat to another diplomatic step, a long-term peace with Israel in 1979. Besides 
the peace agreements known as the Camp David Accords, this peace settlement ensured 
U.S. military and economic aid and was the beginning of the two countries’ long lasting 
relationship.112 
During the years after Camp David, Egypt, under Mubarak’s 
leadership, became one of the most valuable American allies in the region. Simply put, 
since the 1970s, Egypt’s support was bought, and cost the U.S. dearly, with a total of 
some $60 billion of economic and military aid. However, the money ensured Egyptian 
support and mediation in the region with regard to U.S. Middle Eastern policy and 
maintained at least a cold peace with Israel. Nevertheless, Egypt’s leader often had 
problems remaining loyal to his American sponsor, based on Egypt’s own regional 
interests and the U.S. special relationship with Israel. Israeli policies and economic 
endeavors had a repeated severe impact on the Egyptian domestic situation, causing 
public protest or simply presenting a disadvantage for Mubarak’s own regional influence, 
though the annually paid $2 billion presenting welcome and needed state revenue, was 
eventually convincing America’s Arab lieutenant to stay in line. Malicious gossip had it 
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that Egypt was America’s poodle. Some compared the Egyptian president with a 
payphone—pay money and get what you want in return.113  
Besides the pursuit of financial and political interests that led to the 
alliance between the U.S. and Egypt, and the problems it caused, it had a far-reaching 
impact for Egypt’s Islamists, and especially the MB. First, after the terrorist attacks in 
2001, Egypt became one of the Americans’ most willing enforcers of the U.S. strategic 
approaches to Global War on Terrorism objectives. The traumatic events intensified the 
intelligence cooperation between the two states, integrated Egypt’s security apparatus 
into the CIA’s Extraordinary Rendition Program, and eventually legitimized repression, 
torture, and assault on civil liberties against all kinds of Islamist movements. For this 
reason, the emergency law and the later passed anti-terrorism law equipped Mubarak 
with substantial freedom of action and legitimacy. Thus, the banner of fighting terrorism 
provided further rationale for the regime’s domestic policies to meet the rising influence 
and political engagement of the moderate Islamist opposition embodied by the MB. 
Furthermore, this supported Mubarak’s unimpeded actions in order to restrict civil 
liberties and political rights that eventually strengthened his own authoritarian rule in 
Egypt.114  
Second, in the following years a shift in U.S. Middle Eastern 
policy pushed the MB and facilitated its tremendous success in the parliamentary 
elections of 2005. The policy shift was based on the increasing public resentment of 
American foreign policy throughout the region. After the invasion in Afghanistan and 
Iraq, along with the U.S.-led War on Terrorism, the Arab and Muslim world perceived 
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the military presence in the oil-rich countries as a form of imperialism and humiliation. 
As a consequence, public opposition in many regimes that had supported the different 
U.S. endeavors faced domestic unrest and strong criticism. This was met again by 
intensified repression and eventually dashed all hopes for reforms. For this reason, the 
U.S. sought to improve their image throughout the region by setting out for a political 
change towards further democratization and liberalization. In the context of this policy 
shift, the Americans also increased the pressure on Mubarak to allow further 
democratization along with free and fair elections as an important prerequisite for 
change. This granted freedom for the MB’s political engagement, which was rewarded 
with 88 seats in parliament for the movement.115 
Third, since the mid-1980s, Egypt’s social problems and the 
decline of the Egyptian welfare state caused growing dissatisfaction among the Egyptian 
population. Besides the direct public resentment mentioned above, U.S. policy in the 
Middle East led to different military engagements that once more caused decreasing 
revenue and economic disadvantages. This again resulted in social problems and further 
Egyptian anti-Western sentiment. The stagnation of political reforms and the perception 
of increasing social imbalances and corruption added further fuel to the fire. The 
Egyptians were done with Mubarak. They finally  had “enough” and longed for political 
change. The Kifaya (enough) movement of the regime’s opposition emerged as a valve 
for the atmosphere and wish for change in Egypt. Furthermore, many were attracted by 
the political objectives of the MB, who had often supported the people when the regime 
had failed to fulfill its social contract. Along with a clear and liberal political program, 
which “dealt with religious, social, political, economic, and cultural reforms; the 
relationship with the Copts; and the situation of women”116 and promised change, the 
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MB’s Islamist ideas managed to win the hearts and minds of many Egyptians. Thus, this 
public backing also ensured the MB’s electoral triumph in 2005.117  
However, the result of U.S. influence on the Egyptian elections 
and the strong public support as a consequence of the people’s wish for change was not 
well perceived in Washington. For American decision makers, such an overwhelming 
success of the MB in Egypt and also for Hamas, the MB’s offspring in Palestine, in the 
same year, was alarming to U.S. decision makers. Uncertain about how to deal with this 
development, to a certain degree unable to differentiate between different Islamist 
movements’ political goals, and also too much impressed by dark visions of the future 
drawn by authoritarian rulers fearing to lose their leadership, the U.S. relativized its 
strong democratic rhetoric again. The Americans decided not to risk the alliance with 
Egypt and moreover probably U.S. interests in the Middle East. Rather than starting a 
journey into the unknown with a new unpredictable Islamist movement, the U.S. 
approved a stagnated democratic development after the elections in 2005 and even a 
democratic setback by Mubarak’s constitutional changes in 2007.118 
This section focused on the influences of the U.S.-Egyptian 
alliance that emerged in the 1970s. U.S. policy in the Middle East played a dominant role 
in this relationship. This led to different impacts on the Egyptian domestic level, which 
again had consequences for the development of the MB during the Mubarak era. For the 
most part, U.S. political influence or the absence of it, as in the end of the last decade, 
needs to be considered as an obstacle for the moderate political activism of the MB. The 
U.S. granted Mubarak freedom and legitimacy to prevent a political rise of the movement 
under the banner of the War on Terrorism and, if necessary, by the use of repressive 
means.  
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During the period of advocacy for democracy, U.S. policy 
presented an opportunity for the movement. U.S. influence, public support and 
dissatisfaction with the ruling regime, and the MB’s clear moderate and liberal political 
objectives helped to push the movement and enabled success. However, the U.S. was 
unable to deal with the consequences of this result, and backtracked from its 
democratization campaign, preferring authoritarian rule over democratic development for 
the protection of its interests in the Middle East. Combined with the regime’s 
constitutional changes, a successful political chapter in the MB’s history was closed and 
brighter future conditions under Mubarak denied. 
b. Intrinsic Factors 
Internal factors can also have important effects. With regards to the topic 
of this chapter, therefore, the following paragraphs will especially assess leadership, the 
generational and organizational structure of the MB, and ideological aspects. 
(1) Generational Aspects. In the early 1980s, the so-called “middle 
generation” reinforced the MB. Back in the 1970s, these members were the students who 
had formed student associations or unions and actively opposed leftist elements. Now 
that they had left university and entered professional life, they further affiliated with the 
MB and breathed new life into the organization. The members of the middle generation 
were young, skilled, and energetic Islamic activists who launched a new wave of political 
engagement of the Society of Muslim Brothers in the 1980s and early 1990s. They had 
the full backing of Umar al-Tilmisani, the Brothers’ Supreme Guide, who even after the 
repression of the Islamists in connection with Sadat’s assassination held to a moderate 
path.119 
This new charismatic generation of MB members found broad 
support on the periphery of the Egyptian state within the Islamic networks that formed 
the parallel Islamic sector. In the following years, they managed to use their network-
based financial and organizational capacities to increase their popularity and achieve their 
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political objectives within the narrow framework set by Mubarak. Striving for social and 
political power, the young generation first focused on Egypt’s two-dozen professional 
associations and, step by step achieved a leading role within these unions. They were 
pushing further away from the political periphery and towards the center of politics, 
which meant representation as a party at the People’s Assembly. However, legal 
establishment of the party was definitely denied by the ruling regime in the mid-1980s. 
Nevertheless, growing influence in professional associations and the MB’s popular base 
in the parallel Islamic sector paved a quite successful way for sedulous, electoral 
cooperation with registered political parties to access parliament.120  
Topics like political freedom, state repression, cultural and 
educational issues, corruption in politics, and economic concerns entered the political 
agenda of the MB. This revealed the growing importance within the MB of political 
views and participation as a political party. The reluctance to violence surfaced in anti-
radical statements and open opposition against the state’s means of repression. The 
Muslim Brothers adopted the behavior of a flexible, political party by competing, 
cooperating, and forming alliances with legal parties and playing the political game. They 
focused on the voter, campaigning and developing political programs embedded with 
their agenda and their Islamist ideals. At the same time, there was a further opening 
towards groups of other religious beliefs, like the Copts, by accepting them as full 
citizens.121 With regards to the development of the MB during the 1980s, Ramadan gets 
to the point: “…the Muslim Brotherhood transformed itself into a parliamentary political 
party with a unique place, existing and yet not existing on the political map.”122 
Despite repression in the mid-1990s, the middle generation 
managed once more to use its opportunities to gain power after its most influential figures 
left prison a couple of years later. The MB abided by their political orientation and took a 
clear position on “…non-Muslims, the relationship between religion and politics, 
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violence and politics, and human rights.”123 While Islamic values remained crucial, 
contemporary and political experience became more important to the Brothers. Overall, 
democratic values—like equality among Muslims and non-Muslims, free votes, freedom 
of speech, as well as a constitution specifying and regulating a balance of powers—
substantially formed the political program of the organization.124  
However, the imprisonment of the Brothers’ open-minded 
generation left the MB in the hands of the old guard during important electoral periods. 
These older MB members caused a retrograde step in the ideological development pushed 
by the younger members. The elders caused harm to the MB’s public reputation by 
reviving and following the idea that the sole source of authority should be shari’a, and  
fell back on rather old-fashioned views concerning non-Muslims, party politics, and 
Islamic life in general, including the role of women. Therefore, the younger generation, 
which supported popular sovereignty, became increasingly frustrated. The separation of a 
group from the Muslim Brotherhood, the so-called Center Party (Hizb al-Wasat), was an 
inevitable consequence.125 
After the millennial, when the most influential personalities of the 
old guard had passed away, the MB revived its political activity and openness. Its new 
Supreme Guide, Muhammad Mahdi Akif, officially and publicly adopted the ideas of the 
younger generation and pushed the political goals of the organization.126 In a press 
conference, Akif presented a manifesto, which “dealt with religious, social, political, 
economic, and cultural reforms; the relationship with the Copts; and the situation of 
women.”127 Furthermore, he demanded a constitutional, parliamentary, and democratic 
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system, criticized the Egyptian regime, and opposed any foreign interference, especially 
addressing U.S. president Bush’s Greater Middle East Initiative.128  
With this political agenda, and supported by the U.S. Democracy 
Reform Initiative, several of the MB’s candidates achieved a bedrock electoral success in 
the parliamentary elections of 2005. The authoritarian regime responded with different 
constitutional changes. These legal hurdles ended the MB’s opportunity to penetrate the 
political arena and made a similar result in future elections impossible. Based on this 
renewed setback and further state repression, traditional currents once more 
incrementally gained the upper hand within the movement until the end of the Mubarak 
era. The draft of a party platform in 2007, which put many democratic values of the 2005 
political agenda into a different perspective, and the dominance of conservative figures 
within the leading level of the organization, support this argument.129 
But the old guard and the middle generation do not complete the 
generational structure of the MB. There is a third generation that joined the movement 
during the 1990s. The repressive experiences of these years raised a sentiment to 
withdraw from the public ground level and assured the survival of the MB by remaining 
underground. Being religiously and ideologically conservative, they filled rural midlevel 
leadership posts, ran the MB’s administrative organs, and pursued the missionary 
outreach of the movement. Due to their religious and ideological views and their inward 
orientation of denying public politics in favor of ideological outreach, they are close 
supporters of the old guard and are often referred to as neo-traditionalist.130 
A last group represents the youth of the MB. This generation is 
considered far more open and curious than the old guard and the neo-traditionalists. The 
majority of young MB members aim at reaching more freedom, social justice, and a 
modern way of life based on an Islamic identity. They use new Internet-based 
technologies and social networks to express their opinion on all aspects of society and 
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politics. Similar to the middle generation back in the 1970s and 1980s, these blogger-
activists—as Marc Lynch calls them—have their roots in the urban university 
environment of Cairo and Alexandria and bring a fresh breeze into the MB. They have 
“not undergone the rigorous ideological indoctrination and organizational grooming that 
former generations of Brothers underwent,” which enables them to freely criticize the 
religious focus under the old guard’s influence and the strictly hierarchical, opaque 
organizational structure of the movement.131 Due to their ideas, open criticism, and 
hierarchical status, the conservative MB members put severe pressure on the young or 
pay scant attention to their views. In the past, the reformists were deeply involved in their 
struggle with the conservatives and now stand to lose the link to this new generation of 
political activists, who present a welcome support for their political objectives.132     
The struggle between the old guard and middle generation clearly 
dominated the past thirty years within the MB. By the end of the past decade, the older 
conservative generation prevailed and assumed power by pushing its candidate on the 
murshid post. This back and forth between the two currents consequently led to several 
setbacks of the moderate development of the MB whenever the old guard was in charge 
of the organization. Supported by neo-traditionalist reinforcement, they finally managed 
to consolidate their power and edge the reformists out of the leadership level. 
Furthermore, members of the middle generation obviously missed 
the opportunity to integrate the young generation, who have, for the most part, a similar 
background and pursue recognition within the MB. Their fresh, open-minded influence 
and their interest in democratic values and objectives may once again boost internal 
reforms and revive political activism. Otherwise, the moderate reformist movement has 
reached a dead end. 
(2) Leadership. Alison Pargeter describes Umar al-Tilmisani’s 
death in 1986 as a “watershed moment for the Ikhwan.”133 Al-Tilmisani was the prime 
mover behind the reformist current of the middle generation. He was a vigorous leader 
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who was respected within the MB and supported young political activists in their pursuit 
of a more open approach to achieving their goals. The end of internal reform, but also the 
loss of an outstanding leadership figure, was considered a bitter consequence of his death 
by many of the new successful guard. The leading political activist who had set the 
Brothers’ agenda for almost a decade and pushed the movement along a moderate path 
into the political arena was gone.134  
Al-Tilmisani’s death presented an opportunity for conservatives to 
regain the leadership of the movement and mint the organization according to their ideas. 
The key members of the nizam al-khass current returned from exile and brought an era of 
new rigidity to the MB. However, when they resumed their work in the 1980s, they at 
first stayed on the sidelines and opted for indirect influence. Al-Tilmisani’s successor at 
the General Guide’s post, Hamid Abu al-Nasr, was unable to follow in his predecessor’s 
footsteps. He lacked al-Tilmisani’s leadership skills and suffered from serious health 
problems, which left the MB with a weak General Guide for a decisive period. For this 
reason, his appointment was supported by conservatives who used this weakness to 
increase their influence. The old guard increasingly restricted and opposed the political 
endeavors of the moderate movement, which provoked a growing internal schism.135  
The young were frustrated about these developments and hoped for 
changes with regards during the MB Guidance Office election of 1995. But when the 
election resulted in no change and, moreover, after the death of al-Nasr in 1996 the old 
guard dominating the office simply appointed one of their own as the new murshid 
(Mustafa Mashour), frustration grew. Finally, when the reformists were fed up with the 
rigid ideological backwardness and the authoritarian traits of the old guard’s dominance, 
the internal schism between both sides reached its climax and resulted in the breakaway 
of young political activists. They formed the Hizb al-Wasat and found a way to abide by 
their moderate political ideas of popular sovereignty, party pluralism, and civil and 
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human rights for both genders and all religions. The Wasat members intended to be an 
overarching party for all Egyptians and did not differentiate between Muslims and non-
Muslims.136  
While parts of the middle generation broke away, other reformists 
were arrested over the course of the regime repression in mid-1990. Thus, until after the 
turn of the century, the MB remained under conservative leadership. After the death of 
the last guide assigned to the nizam al-khass group in 2004, a new Supreme Guide, 
Muhammad Mahdi Akif, publicly endorsed the ideas of the younger generation who 
returned from imprisonment and picked up the lost moderate path, despite belonging to 
the MB’s elders. However, a strong influence of conservative currents remained within 
the organization. Along with the political suppression of the regime, the draft party 
platform of 2007 presented a step back to old Islamic attitudes with regards to women 
and non-Muslim minorities, a sign of strong conservative influence. Furthermore, the 
moderate voices like Muhammad Habib and reformist leader Abdel Moneim Abu al-
Futouh were step by step pushed out of leadership positions. Akif proved to be unable to 
keep or bring reformist members to the leadership level of the MB. His last attempt to 
promote Essam Erian, who is associated with the MB’s reformist wing, led to an éclat 
with the conservative camp and resulted in Akif’s resignation as the General Guide in 
2009.137 
The new conservative murshid, Muhammad Badie, elected after 
the dispute in 2010, is regarded as a leader lacking intellectual and political vision for 
political openness and the will and power to trigger internal reforms. In the beginning of 
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his term, he placed the emphasis on strengthening the organization, religious-oriented 
ideological outreach, and shifting away from political engagement and public life. This 
differs from the weakened, moderate-wing demands for a more active public role based 
on political activism.138 But despite this conservative shift in the leading levels of the 
MB, an International Crisis Group interview with a leading Muslim Brotherhood member 
reveals that “this closed-minded [conservative] group is not dominant. It is in power.”139 
This comment once more underlines the importance of the Brotherhood’s organizational 
structure, which underlies a strict top-down approach. This means that whoever is in the 
lead is obviously setting the agenda of the movement.  
It becomes clear that the MB entered a phase of leadership struggle 
after al-Tilmisani’s death. This internal dispute is mainly based on the disagreement 
between conservative and moderate views about the MB’s future engagement within the 
Egyptian society and politics. As a result of repeated setbacks caused by the state’s 
repression, and especially the strong constitutional boundaries after the 2005 elections, 
conservatism dominated the leadership by 2010. Moreover, being at the top of the MB’s 
hierarchical and pyramidal organization means not necessarily representing a dominant 
opinion of its members but deciding what direction the movement will take. 
(3) Organizational Structure. The objective during the Sadat era of 
maintaining and expanding the organization was reassumed when Mubarak shifted to 
accommodation with the MB in the early 1980s. As a consequence, the MB began to 
expand its influence in Egyptian society. Like al-Banna, they started to build up a strong 
religious, social, economic, and political network—the parallel Islamic sector—within 
society. Besides providing, for instance, health, educational, or financial services, the 
parallel Islamic sector also included private mosques, which ensured a broad penetration 
of society. As in times of their founding father, the MB members were able to assure 
others that they were able to deliver social services and political change within the 
narrow borders set by the regime. They managed to tie their political ideas and promises 
directly to their actions, convinced others of the organization’s objectives, and rapidly 
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attracted new members. At the same time, the MB gained sympathies by providing 
services the regime was supposed to deliver, and emerged as a serious competitor. The 
capacity of the parallel Islamic sector was enormous and facilitated the MB’s support 
during the earthquake in 1992. Finally, the deep entanglement within the Islamic network 
periphery of the Egyptian state made it very difficult for the regime to proceed against the 
well-placed Islamist opposition. The sector was characterized by its extremely 
decentralized and flexible structure, which made any regime influence, or even the 
attempt of control, very difficult. Mubarak and his state authorities, backed by the 
massive security apparatus, lacked the capacity to contain the MB’s activities.140  
This endeavor was closely linked to the organizational structure of 
the MB. In order to meet the requirements of its new role in society and politics, based on 
the network and the different social backgrounds it had to deal with, the movement began 
to rebuild its various specialized departments and branches—one of them was the newly 
formed political section. The growing mass movement became more decentralized with 
regards to management and administration. The Brotherhood was able to improve their 
effectiveness while becoming less vulnerable to regime influences. However, despite 
granting more freedom to the regional and provincial levels, the elite of the MB retained 
its central and dominating role, deciding important issues and passing down major 
objectives and policies. Finally, the MB opted for election of the different leadership 
posts on all levels and abandoned its traditional way of appointing leaders based solely on 
seniority. This was an important development that introduced democracy to the internal 
organizational structure, ensured internal transparency and permeability for posts, 
hampered the old boys’ network of internal authoritarianism, and later lent credence to 
the MB’s democratic objectives.141 
However, the remarks on leadership above present evidence that 
the changes in the organizational structure were not successful with regard to internal 
authoritarianism. The strictly hierarchical top-down approach with regard to the 
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orientation of the movements ensured that whoever gained power was able to set the 
agenda. This presents an explanation why the prominent public political voices of the 
Brethren’s successful parliamentary bloc carried less weight in questions referring to 
internal decision making and tended to defer to MB leadership. 142 Furthermore, as 
described above, it remained difficult to enter the highest leadership levels through 
elections, and the traditional appointment system prevailed in different situations. This 
implies a lack of organizational permeation.  
A change of its organizational structure equipped the MB with the 
necessary means to become a mass movement. Furthermore, it facilitated the 
organization’s broad access to society, which again provided a powerful backing for the 
MB’s political objectives. Additionally, the new organizational structure, but also the 
Brothers’ deep-rooted entanglement in the periphery of the Egyptian state made aimed 
actions against the Islamist movement difficult. Consequently, the combination of 
organizational changes and involvement in the parallel Islamic sector ensured support 
and protection for the objectives envisioned by MB leadership. Despite these successes 
and through changes in the organizational structure, the internal electoral processes did 
not prevail on every account. However, this factor is critical for change and equality 
within an organization. Combined with a form of strict organizational hierarchy and the 
consolidation of conservative beliefs in the highest levels of leadership, these 
developments must be considered as a setback for moderate ideas and its driving force, 
the reformist camp.  
(4) Ideological Considerations. As the previous sections have 
shown, ideological views referring to al-Banna’s thoughts of the role of Islam in Egyptian 
society were consolidated within the conservative camp of the movement. However, in 
the 1980s, the rise and influence of the middle generation within the movement 
introduced political activism. This new concept added to the emergence of a strong 
second moderate and open-minded grouping within the MB and, eventually, among other 
reasons, to the breakaway of some members in the 1990s. As Bruce Rutherford points 
out, the moderate political agenda of the young activists of the middle generation was 
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strongly influenced by the ideas of different Islamic theorists. Their research and writings 
on Islamic governance and constitutionalism were based on a modern and moderate 
interpretation of the Islamic values and principles represented in the Qur’an and shari’a 
law.143   
The moderate MB members seized many of the ideas of Islamic 
constitutionalism—like personal freedom, consultation and authority of the people, a 
ruler’s accountability to the people, and a system based on a balance of powers—which 
were largely incorporated in the political campaign platform of 2005.144 A strong second 
ideological position emerged within the movement and aspired increasingly for 
recognition, which eventually led to internal schism between conservatives and 
moderates. As a consequence, this moderate political path must be considered the 
ideological standpoint of the reformist who freed himself from the traditional ideology of 
the MB elders.  
Contemporary Salafism was another ideological influence that 
regained increasing influence during the Mubarak era, due to a general regional 
radicalization and domestic repression in many countries. These impacts, and especially 
the ongoing frustration with the fruitless political engagement, a perception of 
leadership’s unwillingness to confront the challenges of the day, and anger against the 
ongoing repression influenced many MB members of the third and fourth generation and 
caused further dissatisfaction.145 
As a matter of fact, the MB’s drive for organizational expansion 
and security, combined with its structural change, led to an increasing penetration of rural 
populations. Here, Salafist ideas had a fruitful base among the people, which again 
caused its increasing encroachment into MB membership of more traditional and less 
tolerant ideological views. These developments led to further support of the conservative 
attitude of a more religious role. On the other hand, however, some authors predict an 
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increasing radical mindset based on the alarming military attitude of different Muslim 
Brotherhood youth groupings. This development gives reason for concern in the higher 
leadership levels of the MB. Leadership seems to be losing touch and control over some 
members of the younger generation. Although so far no violent actions have been 
committed, the higher ranks fear the consequences for the MB if these impatient and 
radical young are not brought to reason.146 
The findings presented above indicate that considerable ideological 
development and influence have affected the MB. Besides the ideological current 
reaching back to the MB’s founding father, focusing on a missionary role, another 
grouping, the reformists, interpreted Islamic values and principles differently. This 
facilitated a rethinking towards political engagement and openness and a center role of 
the principles of Islamic constitutionalism. In contrast to the first ideological current, the 
politically oriented view made further political learning, and a change of some 
conservative core values and beliefs, possible. It thereby built a bridge between Islamic 
values and beliefs and a secular understanding of politics, and consequently opened the 
door for further moderate political development.  
A final ideological view, contemporary Salafism, entered the arena 
by influencing many young and rural members of the movement. This influence leads 
either to a stagnation of the progresses made by the middle generation, by supporting the 
MB’s elders or—an even more dangerous outcome—may present a revival of radical 
elements. A revival of radicalism would mean a serious blow to the MB as a whole.  
c. Summary of Findings 
These findings, based on a broad analysis rooted in the organizational 
theory based approach, offer valuable explanations to the moderate development of the 
MB. External influences like the accommodation policy of the regime and the U.S. 
regional democratization initiative facilitated opportunities for the MB to successfully 
engage within Egyptian society and politics. Furthermore, leadership decisions combined  
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with the character of the movement’s organizational structure and the ideological 
openness of a whole generation of Brethren to political activism and modern and 
democratic views pushed and consolidated the moderate path. 
However, the same factors also presented obstacles that led to several 
setbacks and a stagnation of moderation. The repressive actions of the increasingly 
authoritarian regime supported by U.S. policies ended the political endeavors of the MB 
by the end of last decade. This last smackdown for the reformist MB path facilitated the 
emergence of a renewed conservative sentiment, which also managed to regain leadership 
positions. Combined with the disadvantages of the Brethen’s organizational structure, the 
internal pursuit of moderate objective seems to be a long shot. Finally, increasing Salafist 
influence adds to these disadvantages and, moreover, threatens to be a high risk for the 
MB in general.  
Overall, as this deep analysis shows, using an approach based on 
organizational theory is an excellent tool to answer the research question this chapter 
focuses on. It allows detailed investigation that allows a comprehensive analysis of the 
reasons for organizational decision making. 
2. Other Theoretical Explanations 
a. Pothole Theory 
According to this theoretical approach, a party changes its objectives and 
attitudes to gain support and please voters. Over time, it becomes more entangled in 
satisfying the concerns of the public and incrementally leaves its old—maybe radical—
agenda to deliver solutions. In short, a group’s ideological and political appearance in 
public transforms itself to avoid audience costs that weaken the party’s base.  
During the increasing political activity of the MB, beginning in the 1980s, 
the reformists’ political work was to a certain degree focused on the voter and public 
sentiment in different matters. This supports the pothole theory argument at first glance. 
Moreover, the engagement of the MB within the parallel Islamic sector added to its 
successful political work. By providing many services that normally should be covered 
by the ruling regime, they impressed great parts of the Egyptian population and ensured 
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the support in the political arena. For these reasons—taking care of ordinary concerns and 
responding to wishes for democratic development and liberalization—the pothole theory 
seems to provide an answer for the moderate development of the MB. 
However, these are the only reasons that support this theoretical approach. 
There are different arguments that weaken the pothole theory as an explanation for the 
MB moderation. First, political activity and its consequences can only be attributed to the 
reformist camp of the Brotherhood and were not generally supported within the MB. The 
period in question shows that there is strong disagreement about the political engagement 
of the organization, and that the MB’s path was dictated by its leadership. This was 
supported by the hierarchical, top-down approach the organization followed. 
Consequently, while communication with the voter and satisfaction of his demands is a 
possible explanation for the reformists’ moderation and denial of violence, it does not 
present an argument for the conservative camp’s concentrating around the old guard. 
Furthermore, political activity is only one part of the MB’s engagement. Most of the 
departments of the MB focus on religious, social, and financial engagement within 
Egyptian society, but especially within the parallel Islamic sector. The political section is 
only one of many. Thereby, political engagement has not necessarily been a priority 
within the Muslim Brotherhood as a whole. 
Second, the Mubarak regime was authoritarian, and interested neither in 
democratic development nor in the emergence of a political opposition that would be a 
risk or threat to its own powerful position. Changing this environmental condition was 
not in the hands of the Brethren. However, only a more democratic framework allows 
unopposed and unhampered party work and communication with the voter. Furthermore, 
only in a democratic environment free, fair, and open elections are possible. Without 
these opportunities any communication between a party or political group and the voters 
is corrupted. As a result, an exchange of opinion or negative response in the form of good 
or bad electoral results is not possible. A pursuit of political work in order to achieve 
electoral success was never an option for the MB because the outcome was dependent on, 
or at least strongly influenced by, the authoritarian elite’s repressive actions and 
constraints. 
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The last counterargument is also strengthened by the fact that the decision 
to follow a moderate path and, later, political engagement, was primarily a leadership 
position dating back to the 1970s. One reason was to ensure security for the MB within 
the authoritarian framework. Legitimacy by recognition as a political party became a 
major goal towards securing the organization against regime influence. Despite the fact 
that the regime allowed limited political engagement by the MB, it never recognized the 
organization as a political party. Consequently, the reformist camp, supported by a strong 
murshid, used the opportunities Mubarak offered to improve its domestic and 
international reputation and acceptance as a moderate political force within Egypt. This 
argument shows that legitimacy and acceptance were major objectives of the MB’s 
political endeavors, more than the fixing of voter potholes.  
Based on these arguments, the pothole theory, which is based on a party-
voter relationship, does not present a comprehensive explanation for the development of 
the MB during the Mubarak era. Leadership and the authoritarian environment need also 
be considered. Certainly, the assessment would be a different one in a more democratic 
environment or at least within a state transitioning to democracy. This would allow the 
engagement of all forms of opinions in the political arena without an external threat that 
leads to a group’s interest in survival. Such a competitive environment would also 
automatically push political activists to focus more on the voter as the key to influence 
and existence in politics. 
b. Median Voter Theory 
Anthony Downs is convinced that a party or group entering the political 
game is solely interested in success. As a result of clear priority, the party focuses 
primarily on meeting the expectations of the main group of voters, the median voters, 
even if this does not match its ideology or the opinion of its original social platform. As a 
consequence, over time these organizations move away from extreme or radical ideas. 
The MB gained power, strength, and influence in the political arena by its 
religious, social, and financial work within the parallel Islamic sector, its influence in 
professional syndicates during the 1980s and 1990s, and its moderate political agenda in 
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the beginning of this century. Despite the authoritarian framework, which was a critical 
and limiting factor by determining the rules of any engagement, the MB abided by its 
moderate themes. They focused on liberalization and further democratic development in 
order to get the masses on their side. Similar to the argumentation presented above 
regarding the pothole theory, electoral success depended on authoritarian rule within the 
Egyptian state. Access to the Egyptian public was massively regulated by the different 
repressive means applied by the regime. This prevented the MB’s unconditioned 
influence on the voters prior to and during elections and free communication with 
potential voters.  
Both missionary and political work supported the goal of increasing power 
and influence in Egypt’s society. However, considering the internal divide between 
moderate and conservative currents within the MB, this does not present a satisfying 
argument as to whether the organization has truly renounced extreme, revolutionary, or 
radical positions. Many scholars argue that the political announcements and endeavors 
were only tactical means to achieve power in Egypt or ensure survival against repression. 
In their eyes, the policies of avoiding direct confrontation with the regime during the 
1980s and internal schism, which again and again led to changing announcements with 
regards to democratic values, are telling. Examples are the repeated setbacks of the 
moderate democratic developments in accordance with the influence of the old guard in 
the late 1990s or 2000s. Thus, the changes of direction, along with leadership or 
influence shifts between the conservative and reformist camp, are important and 
underline this point of view. 
These findings show that despite the moderate development of the MB 
over the past thirty years, a satisfactory answer whether moderate views dominate within 
the MB cannot be given when applying the median voter theory. Other factors like 
authoritarian influence, leadership, and generational weight play an important role but are 
not included in the considerations of this theory. 
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c. Michels’s Theory 
Michels argues in his political theory that oligarchy prevents a political 
party from taking risks challenging its existence and that bureaucracy preoccupies and 
prevents it from following revolutionary tendencies. There is some solid evidence 
supporting this theoretical approach. Beginning in the 1970s, the objective of ensuring a 
secure platform for the MB by growth and expansion led to its increasing penetration of 
society and eventually a strong influence within a parallel Islamic sector during the 
following two decades. Furthermore, this development facilitated changes in the 
organizational structure and a considerable increase of bureaucratic elements.  
Additionally, leadership persisted in its central role and abided by a strict 
top-down approach to ensure its influence. The leading elite opted for a new course of 
pursuing its objective of political activism and seeking influence by penetrating the 
political arena while avoiding direct confrontation with the state. Thereby, the leadership 
intended to protect the movement and, hence, its own being. The MB left its original 
sectarian ideological path and the ideas of their founder al-Banna with regards to political 
engagement and shifted towards a self-preserving path of political activism. 
However, Michels’s idea supposes an oligarchic element, which means 
that the elite must have a strong interest in consolidating its position, and uses respective 
means to ensure this. Unfortunately, the research on the topic provides neither the interest 
nor the means. The objective that was pursued by al-Tilmisani and his successors during 
their time as the movement’s General Guides was focused on preserving and securing the 
MB and not on consolidating their leadership. Even effects of oligarchic actions cannot 
be identified.  
On the contrary, despite the fact that the organization follows a strict top-
down approach, internal elections on all levels intend to alert the MB to internal 
authoritarianism and leave opportunities for leadership change. Transparency prevents 
oligarchy. Furthermore, no matter whether a moderate or conservative leadership is at the 
helm, there is always considerable influence by the remainder, leading to the continuous 
internal schism described in this chapter. This shows that there is room for other 
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tendencies within the movement and that they are not completely neutralized by the elite. 
Moreover, this may cause internal discussion but also internal realignments and changes, 
which additionally contradict Michels’s argument that revolutionary tendencies are 
undermined. Consequently, during the period of Mubarak’s presidency, Michels’s theory 
does not provide a satisfying explanation for the continued moderation of the MB. 
d. Islamist Auto-Reform 
Carrie Rosefsky Wickham argues that Islamist auto-reform leads as a 
result of an internal learning process to change in a movement’s goals and strategies by 
members of the movement. Playing the political game and adopting the rules and norms 
of the political environment results in ideological and behavioral changes and provokes 
distancing from strict Islamist views opposing modern democratic concepts and political 
openness.  
The detailed consideration of the middle and the young blogger generation 
in the course of this chapter offers strong evidence for Wickham’s thesis. The middle 
generation was shaped by their work in the different student organizations in the 1970s. 
As young, skilled, and energetic Islamic activists they joined the MB in the 1980s and 
accepted the challenges of the political arena at the time. Supported by the strong backing 
of a murshid open to political activism, as well as the networks of the parallel Islamic 
sector, and strengthened by their electoral successes in the different professional unions, 
they started to penetrate Egyptian politics. Influenced by the constraints of the Egyptian 
political environment and public opinion, they adopted a flexible political behavior, 
cooperated and formed alliances with other parties, and focused on the voter by 
campaigning and developing political agendas addressing political standpoints, problems 
of public interest, and their solutions. Over the years of engagement in politics they were 
more and more open to the ideas of Islamic constitutionalism and democratic principles, 
which they integrated in the campaigning program. Furthermore, they presented clear 
modern positions to many critical aspects of conservative Islamist opinion, for example, 
women in society, non-Muslims, religion and politics, and human rights. 
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A young generation of MB members commenced their political work in 
the past ten years. They have a lot in common with the reformists of the middle 
generation. Experiencing the constraints of the authoritarian regime, the young demand 
further democratic development, pursue political freedom and social justice, support the 
recognition of human rights and civic equality, and are open to a modern way of life 
based on an Islamic identity. They express their political views openly in demonstrations 
or by using modern technological opportunities like the Internet. 
Both generations pursue more openness and modern influence. They 
envision transforming the movement into a politically and religiously open and modern 
organization that also includes internal structural changes that allow more transparency 
and democratic appeal. However, they face severe problems regarding their ideas because 
the conservative camp is in power and unwilling to change. As a consequence, the middle 
generation is expelled from leadership posts and the bloggers are granted neither access 
nor hearing. This leaves the modern reformist movement in a dead end street. 
The findings show that there are two disunited groups within the MB that 
strive for a change to modern democratic ideology and behavior. Although the 
conservative camp is in power, they are challenged by the reformists of two generations. 
This offers at least a promising opportunity of further moderate and democratic 
development for the MB in the future. Thereby, the analysis presented in this thesis 
chapter supports decisive aspects of Wickham’s thesis of Islamist auto-reform as a 
promising explanation for moderation of the MB—even if the process is not completed 
yet. 
Although Wickham includes the leadership aspect as a critical factor in 
moderate development, she does not directly address external factors like the influence of 
the regime or internal factors like organizational aspects in her theoretical approach. 
However, by assuming the leadership role as a key to change, which takes the 
momentous and final decision about internal changes and reactions to external influences 
by considering what is best for the organization, Wickham indirectly pays attention to 
these other factors. Therefore, Islamist auto-reform presents a good theoretical 
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explanation for the moderate and political development of the MB during the Mubarak 
era and points out why the moderation process is not completed or stagnant. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The organizational theory approach of analyzing extrinsic and intrinsic factors 
influencing MB decision making provided a comprehensive explanation for the its 
moderate progression but also the stagnation of this development. In summary it can be 
stated that leadership, generational and organizational structure, and external factors like 
regime and American policies facilitated further moderation.  
The emergence of a generation of young and energetic MB members shaped by 
the Egyptian student unions of the 1970s and supported by the vision of the strong 
Supreme Guide al-Tilmisani proved to be a fruitful combination for continued 
moderation and political activism. Influenced by Islamic constitutionalism and 
democratic concepts, they started to conquer the political arena in spite of the 
authoritarian regime. Despite these external hurdles and without recognition as a party, 
the middle generation used any opportunity of political freedom and eventually became a 
challenging opposition to the Egyptian ruler. The parliamentary elections of 2005 turned 
out to be the peak of their successful work and continuous moderate progression 
characterized by the increasing internalizing of democratic values and modern views on 
Islamic values. 
However, constitutional changes following this success presented a severe setback 
on two accounts. First, due to legal sanctions set by Mubarak, future engagement in the 
Egyptian political arena was impossible. And second, this impasse of the reformists’ 
political work supported the increasing influence of a strong conservative camp. By the 
end of the last decade, the latter regained their leading positions within the MB and 
focused on introversive realignment with a traditional Islamic and missionary orientation. 
Consequently, the moderate development initiated and pursued by the middle generation 
eventually stagnated. Hence, regime repression as well as a generational dominance in 
the organizational leadership led to an obvious stagnation of any moderate progress.  
 93
When considering the other theoretical approaches applied in this chapter, these 
findings correspond in large part with the results based on Wickham’s thesis of Islamist 
auto-reform. These results are thus affirmed through two different perspectives. 
However, the remaining theoretical approaches do not consider essential factors, and 
therefore provide no satisfying explanation of MB moderation during the analyzed 
period. 
External influences, like the opportunities and restrictions presented to the MB by 
the authoritarian regime, and internal factors, like the role of leadership or the will of the 
middle generation, were decisive with regard to moderate progression or its stagnation. 
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A. THESIS FINDINGS 
This thesis offers a thorough analysis of the Muslim Brotherhood’s development 
over succeeding presidencies and sheds light on the manifold external and internal factors 
that have influenced the organization and its increasingly moderate path and continued 
denial of violence in the pursuit of its objectives. Close consideration of these different 
influences provides a comprehensive answer to the given research question. The 
following paragraphs will briefly summarize the findings. 
In the case of external factors, the influence of authoritarian regimes and their 
policies played an important part by providing threats and opportunities to the Muslim 
Brotherhood. State policies of cooperation or accommodation towards the MB, which 
were intended to support the various presidents in achieving political goals and 
strengthening their bases, offered decisive liberties to the Brotherhood. The latter took 
maximal advantage of the often-limited latitude these policies provided in order to pursue 
their objectives.  
Nevertheless, the constraints and repression applied by Egypt’s authoritarian 
leaders created a wide range of obstacles for the Brethren. Nasser’s brutal repression, for 
instance, almost put an end to the MB’s very existence and caused grievances that led to 
a rethinking of non-violence. Under Sadat and Mubarak, repression and legal constraints 
against the MB handicapped, and eventually even stalled, political engagement and 
involvement. These Egyptian presidents felt threatened by the increasing power and 
influence of a rising political opposition and their policies provided an important 
motivation for MB leadership to continue to deny violence. Furthermore, by the rotative 
use of the give and take principle, the regimes provided the MB with opportunities to 
follow a moderate path while also setting its limits. The present findings underline the 
major role of regimes regarding the choice of a moderate political path within an Islamist 
movement.  
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Other external influences like U.S. regional policies or national grief based on 
Egypt’s performance in different wars were also important and need to be mentioned. 
Nevertheless, analysis of these factors exposes two different perceptions. First, they were 
often tied to regime politics and had no direct impact on the MB. Second, they sometimes 
merely provided a good framework for MB endeavors. Therefore, they certainly had 
influence but played a minor role compared to the authoritarian regime. 
While the respective regimes enabled or restricted moderation by imposing 
outside conditions or by influencing the environment, intrinsic factors provide an 
explanation for internally motivated changes, and leadership needs to be considered a key 
factor. In spite of al-Hudaybi’s weak performance as the Brotherhood’s murshid, he 
eventually managed to convince mainstream members to deny violence. This marked the 
emergence of a moderate current within the Muslim Brotherhood. Two of his successors, 
al-Tilmisani and Akif, were strong and moderate-oriented General Guides who abided by 
non-violence but also backed the political activism of the emerging middle generation. 
This enabled even further moderate progress by providing excellent conditions for the 
integration of modern political ideas and democratic values within the movement’s old-
fashioned Islamic ideology.  
However, old-line leadership or influence on weak leaders caused severe setbacks 
for the moderate trend after the repeated imprisonment of some middle-generation figures 
from the mid-1990s to the end of the last decade. Weak leadership leaves room for 
diverse internal trends to emerge and gain influence, which again may cause further 
internal schism. Here, as described in chapters II and IV, General Guides al-Hudaybi and 
al-Nasr were good examples of this phenomenon. All these findings eventually imply that 
leadership plays an important key role in Muslim Brotherhood orientation and, therefore, 
in its pursuit of moderate ideas, but it also plays a key role for the different conservative-
based setbacks. 
The importance of leadership needs to be considered in the context of 
organizational and generational structure but also influential ideological aspects. First, the 
MB’s organizational structure encouraged the deep-rooted social entanglement of the 
Brethren, which provided an excellent basis to support the political endeavors of the 
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middle generation. The MB is characterized by a strict top-down approach, which 
explains why whoever is in power sets the agenda. This has often proved to be a 
disadvantage when conservatives have been in charge of the organization; otherwise, this 
supported the reformist cause.  
Second, moderation and political activism as introduced by al-Tilmisani was only 
possible due to the middle generation, who were shaped by their political work in the 
student unions and open to the strong murshid’s ideas. These young activists were 
receptive to modern views on Islamic values and their political realization. The 
combination of the murshid’s political openness and a reformist middle generation 
strengthened the cause of moderation.  
Third, ideological aspects, or rather, ideological beliefs, also exerted influence on 
MB leadership and the different generational groupings. While al-Hudaybi’s ideological 
views were in opposition to Qutb’s radicalism, they convinced many members to pursuit 
a non-violent path.  Other examples are: the influence of Islamic constitutionalism on the 
middle generation; the old guard and conservative groupings that abide by al-Banna’s 
traditional ideological views; and, finally, the younger generations who were affected by 
an increasing Salafist tendency in their environment. All these examples press the point 
that the influence of ideological beliefs should not be underestimated.   
These findings reveal that a combination of factors enabled the MB to tread the 
moderate path; it is impossible to provide only one decisive factor or reason as an answer 
to the research question. Authoritarian regime politics and MB leadership—combined 
with ideological, organizational, and generational factors—must be considered key in the 
Brotherhood’s moderate political progress over time. Moreover, some of these factors 
changed and had more or less causal weight during the different analyzed periods. 
The validity of the theoretical approaches applied in this research has to be 
assessed critically. Organizational theory and Islamist auto-reform provide valuable 
explanations for the moderate development and denial of violence. However, while the 
first approach was universally applicable during all analyzed periods, Wickham’s thesis 
of Islamist auto-reform was only fully practicable under the last Egyptian president. Both 
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theories are also helpful in explaining the reasons for the obvious stagnation of the MB 
political progress by the end of the last decade. The application of the other three 
approaches offered no satisfying answers to the given question because they do not 
include critical influential factors. Consequently, considering the hypotheses addressed in 
the introduction to this thesis, Hypotheses 1 through 3 do not pertain, but Hypotheses 4 
and 5 apply.  
B. CONSEQUENCES IN LIGHT OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN 
EGYPT 
After the resignation of President Mubarak in February 2011, Egypt underwent 
drastic political changes. The country is dominated by a spirit of optimism about future 
democratic development after Mubarak’s thirty years of authoritarian rule. After 
constitutional changes in March 2011 and under the supervision of the Armed Forces 
Supreme Council, the country is heading now for free, fair, and open parliamentary 
elections in September 2011 and presidential elections some months later. Many parties, 
political movements, and possible candidates have started preparing for the upcoming 
events, among them the Muslim Brotherhood and affiliated independent candidates.147 
This development raises concern in the West, which does not know how to take 
the measure of the Islamists and their objectives. Recent comments by MB leadership on 
the killing of Osama bin Laden, the West, and Israel paint a threatening picture and 
question its true position on radicalism and violence. Furthermore, General Guide 
Badie’s statements on the reconsideration of the peace treaty with Israel seem foreboding 
considering that the Islamists intend to contest up to half of the parliamentary seats and, 
so far, have presented themselves as the best-organized group in the upcoming elections. 
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Despite the military council’s goal of preventing the emergence of an Iranian-style 
theocracy in Egypt, these developments present alarming signs for many observers.148 
However, other voices within the Muslim Brotherhood draw a different picture, 
like the moderate comments of Abdel Moneim Abu al-Futouh, who is running as an 
independent candidate and not as a member of the MB’s newly established Freedom and 
Justice Party. He strongly opposes religious extremism and underlines the importance of 
cooperation among all political and religious views in Egypt. Furthermore, he calls for 
good international cooperation and civilian rule based on the results of the upcoming 
democratic elections. As an insider, al-Futouh pours oil on troubled waters and further 
differentiates between the MB’s political wing, represented by the new party, and its 
social activities. For him, the MB will function as lobby group to the Freedom and Justice 
Party and he anticipates its success as perhaps similar to the 2005 elections, about 25 
percent. This was confirmed by an opinion poll conducted by the Pew Research Center in 
April 2011. The Pew analysts expect an even lower electoral gain of 17 percent.149 
The MB’s youth response is similar. One activist, Khaled Hamza, stated recently 
that for them “moderate Islam means not using violence, denouncing terrorism, and not 
working with jihadists.”150 Most of these younger-generation activists played an active 
role during the revolutionary protests at Cairo’s Tahrir Square and were involved in the 
leadership of the Coalition of the Youth of the Revolution. Through their participation as 
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part of the revolutionary movement and in cooperation with other young opposition 
camps, these young Brothers convinced many observers that they were willing to join 
forces for a common moderate political end and not seeking political gains for the MB’s 
sake. Consequently, the younger generation reinforced the true motives of their cause by 
supporting the revolution. Many of the young had initially joined the Muslim 
Brotherhood because they thought it embraced moderate views on Islamic values. 
However, after the revolution they felt betrayed by MB leadership. The old-line members 
did not grant them access to politics and authority within the organization. Furthermore, 
the youth believed that the conservative wing within the organization opposed a moderate 
path, and showed their discontent by calling for organizational change, or even leaving 
the MB to form or join other parties.151 
These recent post-revolutionary developments endorse the findings of this thesis. 
As described in Chapter IV, there is an increasing schism between the old-line 
conservative wing, represented by the remaining members of the old guard and the neo-
traditionalists, and the reformist, political-activist group of the middle and youngest 
generation. Being in charge of the Muslim Brotherhood, the former dictates the 
development of the organization and obviously opposes moderate progression, which 
drives the wedge even deeper between both sides. A rapprochement between these two 
camps is less and less likely.  
This leads to the assumption that, fostered by the waning of authoritarian 
influence, the reformist and moderate wing will sooner or later break away and pursue 
their own political objectives apart from the Muslim Brotherhood. The first stirrings of 
this increasingly probable development are the separate endeavors of independent 
candidates like al-Futouh and activists of the youngest generation, who seem to be unable 
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to align with conservative views. Recalling the past and the breakaway of Hizb al-Wasat, 
such a split is not unusual for the Muslim Brotherhood in times of conservative 
leadership.  
However, Egypt’s democratic development is still in its infancy. There will be a 
long learning process, and recent developments are already part of this. In the beginning 
of 2011, the Egyptian people showed a willingness to change the future of their country. 
As a consequence, they have opened the doors to free political engagement of the Muslim 
Brotherhood. Now they alone will eventually determine whether the conservative or the 
reformist wing, or both, or neither, will participate in the politics of the country. No 
matter what wing they represent, if members of the MB are elected and gain political 
influence they will have to prove to the Egyptians that they are willing to lead the country 
in line with democratic values. It remains to be seen what kind of stuff they are truly 
made of.   
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